

CURRENT *History*

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JUNE 1964

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CURRENT History

JUNE, 1964

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How successful have disarmament negotiations been in the twentieth century? What are the hopes for the future? In this issue, first of a 3-issue set on weapons control, six articles set the problem in historical perspective. Noting that in the 1960's "the prospects of peace appear much brighter," our introductory article maintains that "technical agreements on the control of armaments are less important than the self-restraint, the patient will to negotiate and the openness to discourse which, if practiced over a long period, can create the conditions for concrete limited armament agreements."

Prospects for World Peace: An Overview

By HANS KOHN

Fellow, Center for Advanced Studies, Wesleyan University

SINCE the beginning of the twentieth century, with its rapidly growing increase in the destructive power of modern weapons, the problems of disarmament and the control of weapons systems have been discussed almost continuously. The start was made, interestingly enough, in 1899, in the last year of the nineteenth century, on the initiative of the Russian government. The "lofty" suggestions, then emanating from the Czar, were taken as skeptically as were similar proposals coming later from the Communists. Nevertheless, two International Peace Conferences met in The Hague, in 1899 and in 1907. The major governments were then, and have been since, suspicious of any real limitation of armaments, at least of the armaments they thought they needed for the successful conduct of war.

Although the Hague Conferences proclaimed the limitation of armaments "highly desirable," and although the proscription of

aerial bombardments, of asphyxiating gases and of the laying of automatic submarine contact mines was sought as early as 1899, world peace made no progress in the first half of the twentieth century. When this half-century drew to its close, around 1950, two superpowers with their satellites faced each other in a deadly ideological and power struggle. Both were armed with what was then called the "absolute" weapon; both assumed rigid and inflexible positions; and both expected that one of them would emerge as victor out of this bipolarised worldwide conflict.

What is the situation as the world approaches the mid 1960's? The need to insure world peace has been generally recognized, to a much greater degree than at the beginning of the century when war was still accepted as a "normal" instrument of national politics, or in the 1930's, when the philosophy of fascism which formed then the official

doctrine of several major powers proudly proclaimed the perpetual necessity and the beneficial character of war. In the 1960's, no government and no major political philosophy adhere to such theories. The war of 1914 had been accepted by the majority of the populations involved in high spirits; a quarter of a century later even the citizens of the fascist nations—Germans and Italians—went into the war without popular enthusiasm.

In the 1960's, conferences for the limitation of armaments or for their international control are still being held, as they were before World War I in The Hague and then, with a much greater sense of urgency, in the period between the two great wars waged in Europe and in the Far East. Both of these wars originated in the hegemonic aspirations of the German and Japanese empires.¹ Frustrated, largely through the interventions of the United States, in their first attempt to establish their hegemony in Europe and in Eastern Asia, Germany and Japan tried again in the 1930's. The economic and moral depression in the democracies, the material and psychological disarmament of the West, and the prolonged Stalinist blood-purges in Russia encouraged the Germans and Japanese. The year 1945 put an end to their hopes and their aggressive designs. The following years destroyed the myths of the inevitability of recurrent capitalist depressions and of the need of imperial expansion to maintain capitalist prosperity. But a weapons control agreement remained stalled, largely due to the mutual suspicion and the ideological rigidity of a bipolarised world.

Yet, though the efforts to arrive at any substantial limitations of armament or any effective arms control still seem to be bogged down in the 1960's, the prospects of peace appear much brighter. Seeing the last two decades in perspective, we may arrive at the apparently

¹ The point was strongly made as early as 1915 in Thorstein B. Veblen's *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution* and in 1917 in his *An Inquiry into the Nature of Peace*. The most recent authoritative study on the origins of the war in 1914 and the German war aims is Fritz Fischer, *Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielpolitik des Kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/18* (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1961).

paradoxical conclusion that it may be easier to maintain world peace than to conclude a weapons control agreement. The preservation of world peace and the limitation and extinction of local wars over a long period may succeed in creating a less tense atmosphere which may allow limitation of heavy armaments and diminution of mutual distrust.

The most dangerous period for the preservation of world peace was the first decade after the common victory over Germany in 1945. The two superpowers faced each other then, as if they alone counted in the world and as if heavy armaments represented the only power factor in a world community growing ever more interdependent. Yet, the United States did not make use of its atomic power monopoly, and Joseph Stalin, though a ruthless, omnipotent dictator of a powerful and victorious Soviet Union and its European satellites, hesitated to impose his will upon the hated renegade Tito whose Yugoslav forces were insignificant compared with those of Stalin's war machine.

The United States government, contrary to some military advice, refrained from carrying the Korean War into Communist China. The Soviet Union renounced its rights of occupation in Austria, helped to establish the full independence of the country and respected its Western democratic character as much as that of Finland, Germany's ally in aggression against the Soviet Union. (Lying in the shadow of the Soviet giant, having long common frontiers with the Soviet bloc, Finland and Austria were not attacked or blockaded for following an economic and parliamentary policy totally opposed to that of communism.)

CHANGING COLD WAR

By the middle of the 1960's, the cold war, though it still goes on and will go on for the foreseeable future—nothing in history goes on in perpetuity—has lost its all-inclusive and dominant character. Three factors have contributed to this development:

- 1). *The reassertion of Western Europe.* The German war left Europe prostrate. Largely with the help of the United States,

which held its protective umbrella over Western Europe and poured many billions of aid into its economies, the European nations have in the 1960's regained their strength. No longer are they willing to accept American leadership. Nato, now 15 years old, is threatened in its growth by apathy and disintegration.² Under President Charles de Gaulle, France follows an emphatically French policy, contrary to that of the United States, not only in Europe and toward the Communist countries, but throughout the world. France—and not only France—wishes to become an independent power center, politically, economically and, above all, culturally. A united Western Europe will follow this French example without accepting French leadership. We have here the pattern of the fragmentation of one of the two superpower blocs.

2). *The loosening-up of the Communist bloc.* This bloc is undergoing the same fragmentation as that being felt in the Western world. In 1945, Communist countries and parties formed a monolithic, strictly unified

² See on Nato, Robert Strausz-Hupé, James E. Dougherty and William R. Kintner, *Building the Atlantic World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963) and Frank Munk, *Atlantic Dilemma* (Dobbs Ferry, N. Y.: Oceana, 1964).

³ Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. All European Communist bloc countries are full participants. China sends an observer.

⁴ The quoted words were used by General de Gaulle about Latin America at the occasion of his visit to Mexico in March, 1964. De Gaulle's visits in Latin America in 1964 are as significant as the journey of Communist China's Premier Chou En-lai through Africa, which started with his arrival on December 14, 1963, in Cairo to begin discussions of "Asian-African solidarity." During his trip Chou En-lai also visited Communist Albania, whose Prime Minister, Mehmet Shehu, greeted his visit on December 31, 1963, as "the best New Year's gift for the Albanian people."

⁵ On this global revolution, its roots and manifestations, see Hans Kohn, *The Age of Nationalism. The First Era of Global History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962). The passage in Marx reads: "In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations became common property. . . . The bourgeoisie, by . . . the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. . . . It compels all nations . . . to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst. . . . In one word, it creates a world after its own image."

structure accepting without hesitation direction from Moscow. In 1955, Nikita Khrushchev recognized the right of Communist Yugoslavia to follow its own road, independent from Moscow. By 1964, nothing remains of the monolithic character of world communism. Each Communist country and party follows its own line. The COMECON³ has become even less of a reality than Nato. Moscow has learned to respect the desire of its former satellites to be treated as equals. In the fall of 1963, Communist Rumania, stressing more and more her "Latin" and non-Slav character, twice voted differently from the U.S.S.R. in the United Nations.

3). *The appearance of Asia, Africa, and Latin America "in the foreground of the stage of world affairs."*⁴ The assertion of equality on the part of these "underdeveloped" countries is the great revolution of the mid-twentieth century. It surpasses in global importance the French Revolution of 1789 or the Russian Revolution of 1917. Like its forerunners—the Young Turk revolution of 1908, the Mexican revolution of 1910–1917, the Chinese revolution of 1911–1912 and, finally, Lenin's seizure of power in 1917—the global revolution of our days is a response to the dynamic challenge of modern Western civilization. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this challenge invigorated the North Atlantic countries; Karl Marx, who called it in his oversimplifying way the "bourgeois" revolution, foresaw its worldwide revolutionary implications in his "Communist Manifesto."⁵

These three transformations of the world situation in the 1960's have brought two results. First, they have put an end to the rigidity of a bipolar ideological conflict as it appeared in the early 1950's. This has been replaced by a multiplicity of complex and shifting relationships. The rapprochement of de Gaulle's France and Communist China, of Franco's Spain and Castro's Cuba, the "flirtation" between Pakistan and China, between the Greek Cypriots and the Soviet Union, are only a few random examples of the shifting international scene. There is not one "third force" emerging, but many and

varying "third forces" and realignments, in which ideology plays a minor role.

Second, the growing strength of nationalism everywhere is the best safeguard against the control of mankind by one power or one ideology. Global aspirations of a centrally unified and directed world, pursued in the 1930's by Hitler and the Japanese dynastic oligarchy, and in the 1940's by Stalin, are doomed because each nation insists on being "itself," whatever that may mean in the concrete circumstances. This insistence on equality of status (whatever the actual power behind it) exists today among all nations, strong and weak, old and new, democratic and Communist as well as the very many which are neither democratic nor Communist. This drive has withdrawn Cuba and Panama from the United States' sphere of influence and has frustrated Russia's age-old aspirations of establishing control in the Middle East and her new aspirations of gaining a footing in Africa. These aspirations still dominated Stalin's thought in 1945 when he demanded bases in the Bosphorus, in the Dodekanese, in Eritrea and Libya.

VANISHING ILLUSIONS

In this rapidly changing world, the Soviet Union and the United States are losing the illusion of omnipotence which Stalin had, and some Americans may have had, in the first decade after 1945. Their heavy armaments, their potentiality for overkill, are of no help to them in facing their problems. Khrushchev put forward his West Berlin ultimatum in November, 1958, and though this ultimatum threatened action after six months, West Berlin finds itself five years later as free as it was in 1958.

Nor could Russia impose her will on tiny Albania. Russia was forced by Albania to evacuate her valuable submarine bases at Valona in the Adriatic Sea, her only military stronghold in the Mediterranean area, and on February 24, 1964, Albania seized the Soviet-built and Soviet-owned embassy buildings in Tirana. Against this action Russia could do no more than protest.

In 1961, France defended her most im-

portant Mediterranean naval base at Bizerta against a Tunisian take-over and killed many hundreds of Tunisians; two years later Bizerta was evacuated by the French and came under undisputed Tunisian control. French international prestige suffered as little by this abandonment of an "indispensable" military position as it did by negotiating the complete independence of Algeria. On the contrary, France gained in strength by this policy. Purely military and strategic considerations are losing in importance, and the power of a nation in today's world politics is not based on arms alone.

Under these conditions of the 1960's, technical agreements on the control of armaments are less important than the self-restraint, the patient will to negotiate and the openness to discourse which, if practiced over a long period, can create the conditions for concrete limited armament agreements. A psychological change has to precede any more far-reaching actions.

Such psychological changes are possible, and have happened again and again. Twenty years ago Americans regarded the Japanese and the Germans as their mortal enemies—who would have predicted then their present friendship? Within two years, from the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine in March, 1947, to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April, 1949, public opinion in America turned from extreme isolationism and a deep-seated distrust of British "imperialism" to responsible participation in world affairs in cooperation with Britain. The psychological changes today, which make worldwide intercourse possible and the preservation of peace probable, have crystalized in three areas:

1.) *The changed attitudes of the Soviet and United States administrations.* In its famous letter of July 13, 1963, the Russian Communist party warned the Chinese,

Suffice it to say that the explosion of only one powerful thermonuclear bomb surpasses the explosive force of all ammunition used during all previous wars, including World Wars I and II. And many thousands of such bombs have been accumulated! . . . We ourselves produce the thermonuclear weapon and have manufactured

it in sufficient quantity. We know its destructive force quite well.

Twelve days later, the treaty for a partial nuclear test ban was signed in Moscow. The following day, President John F. Kennedy declared to the American people:

yesterday, a shaft of light cut into the darkness. . . . For the first time an agreement has been reached on bringing the forces of nuclear destruction under international control. . . . It offers to all the world a welcome sign of hope. It is not a victory for one side—it is a victory for mankind. It ended the tests which befouled the air of all men and all nations.⁶

2.) *The Papal leadership toward a reexamination of traditional attitudes of hostility and separateness.* Pope John XXIII stressed in his 1962 encyclical, "Pacem in terris," human liberty, individual rights, equality of races and the importance of the United Nations. The Second Vatican Council convened in the same year intended not only to reform the Church in the spirit of the mid-twentieth century, but to build bridges which, in full awareness of fundamental differences, might open a dialogue and a cooperation in limited concrete fields of common human interest with non-Catholics, non-Christians and non-believers, thus taking into account the growing catholic character of all human problems today.

3.) *The growing importance of the United Nations.*⁷ The United Nations will soon be 20 years old. At that age, the League of Nations was dead after a long agony. The United Nations, on the other hand, is young and growing in strength. It is the recognized meeting ground for all peoples, races, creeds

⁶ See also President Kennedy's commencement address at the American University in Washington on June 10, 1963. The full text was published the next day in *The New York Times* and in *Izvestiya* (Moscow), the official Soviet newspaper. Kennedy rejected in his speech the concept of a *pax Americana* or a *pax Sovietica*. He demanded the recognition of the possibility and necessity for living together in diversity. He said: "Let us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and the means by which these differences can be resolved. And if we can not end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity."

⁷ See, on the United Nations, Hans Kohn, *The Age of Nationalism* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962) pp. 133-167, and Hans Kohn, *Reflections on Modern History* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1963) pp. 327-345.

and ideologies which, aware of their many conflicting interests, follow the Western parliamentary tradition of discussion and compromise. They enter more and more into an open discourse, in which the small nations are heard on equal terms with the great powers.

No one has better defined the nature of the United Nations than Pope Paul VI assuring (in English) the United Nations Secretary-General, who is a Burmese Buddhist, on July 12, 1963, that the Holy See

considers the United Nations as the steadily developing and improving form of the balanced and unified life of all humanity in its historical and earthly order. The ideologies of those who belong to the United Nations are certainly multiple and diverse, and the Catholic Church regards them with due attention. But the convergence of so many peoples, so many races, so many states in a single organization, intended to avert the evils of war and to favor the good things of peace, is a fact which the Holy See considers as corresponding to its concept of humanity.

THE GREATEST PROBLEM

These various changes in the international climate in the 1960's may in the years to come provide a more concrete meaning for the words which President Lyndon Johnson spoke on December 17, 1963, to the United Nations: "The greatest of human problems—and the greatest of our common tasks—is to keep the peace and to save the future. . . . The United States wants to press on with arms control and reduction."

However, it will take some time and much patience and self-restraint on all sides before this goal—a world safe for diversity and a better place for all generations in the future—

(Continued on page 365)

Hans Kohn, Professor Emeritus of History, City University of New York, is a longtime Contributing Editor of *Current History*. His latest two books, both dealing with the problems of world order and world revolution, are *Reflections on Modern History* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1963) and his autobiography, *Living in a World Revolution* (New York: Trident Press, 1964).

Tracing the fruitless attempts to secure international disarmament in the period from 1899 to 1939, and the ensuing great wars, this political scientist reaches the conclusion that "efforts to institutionalize mutual distrust" through present-day schemes of international inspection and control are a "psychological and political impossibility." He tends to agree with Clement Attlee who said, "where there is no mutual confidence, no system . . . will be effective."

The Wasted Decades: 1899-1939

By FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

Woodrow Wilson Professor of Government, Williams College

THREE SCORE AND FIVE years ago the policy makers of the "great powers" initiated negotiations (or what were publicly presented as such) for the reduction, limitation and control of armaments. Sixty-five years and two World Wars later, these efforts are no closer to the goal than they were at the outset. This record of failure, relieved by only one temporary success, is worthy of review for the light that it throws on the nature of the problem. Those among us who are seriously concerned with human survival cannot accept Hegel's dictum that "the only lesson that history teaches is that history teaches no lessons." We must rather recall Santayana's comment that "those who do not remember the past are condemned to relive it."

The present article will be limited to a survey of efforts at disarmament or arms control during the first four decades of the twentieth century. The balance of the record, along with many other aspects of the problem, is dealt with elsewhere in this and subsequent issues of *Current History*.

The failure thus far of almost all attempts by great powers to end arms races is implicit in the nature of a state system of rival sovereignties competing with one another by force, fraud and favors for security or for hegemony. All plans for disarmament under such a sys-

tem are evaluated by national policy makers in terms of a single question: what military advantages can my state gain by proposing, amending or rejecting projects for disarmament? A closely related question is: how much embarrassment can I cause my rivals and potential "enemies" by offering apparently plausible schemes I know they will reject?

Since all humans, including diplomats and strategists, are fallible, mistakes are sometimes made. "Enemies" occasionally accept plans intended to be rejected. Soviet acceptance at Geneva, May 10, 1955, of long-standing Western proposals was one such incident. Harold Stassen (September 6, 1955) was then obliged to say that his Government "does now place a reservation upon all of its pre-Geneva substantive positions." At the tenth United Nations General Assembly in late September, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge repeated the formula of "reservation." Similarly, when Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in 1957-1958 accepted and elaborated Prime Minister Anthony Eden's proposal (at the Geneva Summit Conference of July, 1955) for a zone of disengagement, demilitarization and neutralization in Central Europe, Washington was obliged to repudiate the idea as unthinkable in view of its own security position, and to pressure its allies to do likewise.

The record is full of comparable instances on all sides.

Within this context, the problem has so far proved insoluble. Our present purpose is not to offer a solution (there may be none), but to review the earlier chapters of the record in the hope that they may illuminate a process and clarify the issue.

LOVE'S LABOR LOST

At the turn of the century, attempts by treaty to end competition in armaments were without result save occasionally among minor powers—e.g., several South American republics, and the Norwegian-Swedish frontier neutralization by agreement when they separated in 1905. On January 11, 1899, Count Mouraviev, Russian Foreign Minister, invited other governments to confer on the possibility of an “understanding not to increase for a fixed period the present effectives of the armed military and naval forces, and at the same time not to increase the budgets pertaining thereto; and a preliminary examination of the means by which even a reduction might be effected....” The result was the first Hague Peace Conference, May 18–July 29, 1899, attended by delegates of 26 states. The conferees were unable or unwilling to reach any accord to call a halt to the arms race. Paradoxically, they signed conventions for the pacific settlement of international disputes (establishing the Hague Tribunal for arbitration) and for the codification of certain aspects of the international law of war, including prohibitions on the launching of explosives from balloons, the use of poison gas, and the employment of dum-dum bullets. All of these accords, needless to say, came to nothing in the years to follow.

Again on Russian initiative, the second Hague Peace Conference met from June 15 to October 18, 1907, attended by envoys of 44 states. Again no agreement to reduce or limit armaments proved negotiable. Again conventions were concluded looking toward a World Court and further codifying, elaborately, sundry areas of the international law of war and neutrality. Again these solemn resolves bore no lasting fruit.

In the year 1910, Norman Angell, in *The Great Illusion*, subtitled “A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage,” warned that “military power is socially and economically futile” under twentieth century conditions and that “war, even when victorious, can no longer achieve those aims for which people strive.” The book was translated into 20 languages and sold many millions of copies. The author was later knighted and awarded a Nobel Peace Prize. His work produced no change in the attitudes and goals of national policy makers and patriots. Prevailing attitudes still reflected the conviction of the anonymous English spinster quoted by Norman Angell: “We ought to build our navy up to double the size of theirs if they build theirs up to the point they say they will if we build ours up!” Four years later, the great powers went to war. The result brilliantly vindicated Angell’s analysis. (Twenty-nine years later the great powers again went to war. The outcome, even more strikingly and tragically, demonstrated the truth of Angell’s argument.)

FOLLY PERSISTS

What Mark Twain liked to call “the damned human race” often persists in folly and refuses to learn. Following World War I the victorious Allied and Associated Powers of 1918 imposed disarmament by dictation on the vanquished states. The Turkish Nationalists successfully repudiated the Treaty of Sevres (August 10, 1920) but, under the Treaties of Neuilly (Bulgaria, November 27, 1919), Trianon (Hungary, June 4, 1920), St. Germain (Austria, September 10, 1919), and Versailles (Germany, June 28, 1919), the erstwhile Central Powers were compelled to accept drastic limitations of their armaments. The Weimar Republic of Germany was restricted to an army of 100,000 long-term volunteers and forbidden to possess poison gas, military aircraft, tanks, heavy artillery and submarines, with the prohibitions and controls spelled out in meticulous detail. The Preamble of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles declared: “In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the arma-

ments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval, and air clauses which follow."

The League of Nations came into being on January 10, 1920. Article 8 of the League of Nations Covenant, comprising the first 26 articles of the above treaties, clearly stated that "the Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations." All members were pledged to exchange "full and frank information" regarding their armaments and military programs. The League Council was charged with formulating plans to reduce armaments. These pledges were reaffirmed at the Locarno Conference of 1925, at the meetings of the Temporary Mixed Commission set up by the League Assembly in 1921, in the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance (1924), in the Geneva Protocol (1924), and in innumerable speeches and proposals at Geneva and elsewhere.

DREAM AGAIN DEAD

The diplomatic intricacies of these lost years are too tedious and too void of results to require recounting here. Suffice it to note that the Weimar Republic, with Soviet connivance, evaded the arms restrictions imposed upon it and that other governments debated endlessly the question as to whether security was the prerequisite of disarmament or disarmament was the precondition for security. In 1927, wily Maxim Litvinov shocked the other delegates to the League of Nations Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference by proposing the immediate abolition of all armaments. (Had his proposal been accepted, national power would have become a function of fists, sticks and stones, to the vast advantage of the Soviet Union.) When his proposal was indignantly rejected, he proposed the gradual abolition of all armaments—which was also indignantly rejected.

¹ Hitler, and other Nazis, often boasted that the Third Reich, born January 30, 1933, would last a thousand years.

² Familiar phrase prior to World War II, referring to munitions makers.

On February 3, 1932, with Arthur Henderson presiding over 232 delegates representing 57 states, the League of Nations Disarmament Conference met in Geneva. No less than 337 separate proposals for disarmament were submitted, while open warfare raged in Shanghai in the wake of the Japanese conquest of Manchuria in September, 1931. The Nazi revolution brought an ignominious end to the enterprise. On October 14, 1933, Sir John Simon, on behalf of Britain, France, and the United States, proposed a four-year transitional period designed to meet German demands for equality in arms. On the same day Adolf Hitler announced Germany's withdrawal from the Conference and from the League of Nations. The voters of the Third Reich almost unanimously endorsed the decision in a referendum of November 12. The Conference expired. The recurring dream of disarmament was once again dead.

THE ROAD TO DISASTER

What ensued has become an oft-told and dismal tale. On March 16, 1935, Hitler repudiated Part V of the Treaty of Versailles and reintroduced military conscription in his "Thousand Year Reich."¹ On March 7, 1936, Hitler repudiated the Rhineland Security Pact—one of the seven treaties signed at Locarno—and sent troops into the Rhineland. Policy makers in Paris and London took no action beyond diplomatic protests. Policy makers in Washington, bemused with illusions about the "merchants of death"² and dedicated to "keeping out of other people's wars" through impartial arms and loans embargoes against belligerents, also did nothing.

Appeasement of the Fascist triplice by the Western democracies foredoomed all hope of ending the new arms race and rendered World War II inevitable. On June 18, 1935, Sir Samuel Hoare signed a naval pact with Joachim von Ribbentrop whereby Britain, without consulting its allies, granted the Reich a navy with 35 per cent of the tonnage of the British navy in all categories of warships save submarines, which Germany might build up to a larger percentage of the overall British submarine tonnage. Under these circum-

stances, another naval disarmament conference in London in mid-winter of 1935–1936 achieved little. A new treaty of March 25, 1936, limiting the tonnage and guns of war vessels (with many safeguarding and escape clauses) was signed by envoys of Britain, France and the United States. Japan had abandoned the conference in mid-January and Italy refused to sign. By 1937, all earlier treaty restrictions on armaments had become wastepaper: On April 28, 1939, Hitler abrogated the Anglo-German naval accord of 1935.

Meanwhile, the Atlantic powers had acquiesced in the Japanese seizure of Manchuria; in Mussolini's conquest of Ethiopia; in the Fascist destruction of the Spanish Republic; in Tokyo's unleashing of all-out war on China; in the Nazi annexation of Austria, March, 1938; in Hitler's partition of Czechoslovakia by the terms of the "Peace" of Munich (October 1, 1938); and in his expunging of what was left of the Prague Republic (March 14, 1939). Only when he ceded Carpatho-Ukraine to Hungary (March 16, 1939)—and thus indicated that the *Drang nach Osten*³ was to be deferred pending the conquest of Western Europe as threatened in *Mein Kampf*—did London and Paris embark upon feeble and futile efforts to reconstitute a Grand Alliance.

MOTIVES

This incredible record of folly is not our present concern. But two comments are in order regarding the question of motives—motives which historians have long debated and will continue to debate for years to come. The Western Munichmen, and particularly the Tory leaders of Britain, hoped in the first place to play the neutral role of *Tertius Gaudens* or "Happy Third" in the Sino-Japanese War and in the anticipated war between Hitler's Reich and Joseph Stalin's Russia. (Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov es-

sayed a similar role between August of 1939 and June of 1941, with equally calamitous consequences.) The Western appeasers, in the second place, were more fearful of communism than of fascism and came close to committing national suicide because of their fear.

Even Winston Churchill, who wisely and rightly, but vainly, opposed the appeasers in the 1930's, was correctly described by David Lloyd George as having been in the 1920's the "most formidable and irrepressible" anti-Bolshevik because his "ducal blood revolted against the elimination of Grand Dukes in Russia."⁴ Churchill himself confesses indifference to the outcome of the Spanish Civil War: "In this quarrel I was neutral. Naturally, I was not in favor of the Communists. How could I be, when if I had been a Spaniard they would have murdered me and my family and friends?"⁵

Perhaps the most revealing single statement on the motives of the Munichmen was made in *The Observer* (London) of September 16, 1962, by Lord Home (now Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home) who was private parliamentary secretary to Neville Chamberlain in the 1930's: "I think the main thing to grasp is that Chamberlain, like many others, saw Communism as the major long-term danger. He hated Hitler and German Fascism, but he felt that Europe in general and Britain in particular were in even greater danger from Communism."

MELANCHOLY ANNUAL

In recent years elaborate and expansive efforts to limit, reduce or control armaments by international agreement have continued. In just the period between 1945 and 1962, it has been estimated, 863 international disarmament meetings have been held covering 17,000 hours of alleged "negotiations," during which 18,000,000 words were spoken, and proposals and documents were piled higher than the Alps and the Rockies. These efforts thus far, as before, have been futile.

Only one exception stands out in the melancholy annals of the past. On February 6, 1922, at the Washington Conference, dele-

³ Expansion toward the East.

⁴ David Lloyd George, *Memoirs of the Peace Conference* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939) p. 214.

⁵ See Winston Churchill, *Memoirs of the Second World War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959) p. 96.

gates signed the Five Power Treaty Limiting Naval Armaments, subsequently ratified by the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy. This accord provided for the scrapping of 68 ships of war and limited the major naval powers to roughly 500,000 tons of battleships, battle cruisers, and aircraft carriers for the United States and Great Britain, roughly 300,000 tons for Japan, and roughly 200,000 tons each for France and Italy. The treaty put an end to a dangerous naval race. It was faithfully observed for a dozen years, until Tokyo denounced it, December 29, 1934.

NEED FOR GOOD FAITH

In view of the recent wrangling over international inspection, it is of some interest to ask the question: what forms of international inspection and control were provided by the Treaty of 1922? The answer is: none. The agreement was based on good faith and mutual confidence flowing from shared purposes. In contrast, present-day schemes of international inspection and control are efforts to institutionalize mutual distrust. The record suggests that this is a psychological and political impossibility. In November of 1945, speaking of the new threat of a race in atomic arms, Prime Minister Clement Attlee commented that "where there is no mutual confidence, no system (of control and inspection) will be effective." (He might have added that where there is mutual confidence no system of inspection or control is necessary or desirable.)

Many among us would like to believe that the miracle of 1922 might be repeated in 1964 or soon after and thus put an end to the far more hazardous arms race of our time. However, this is improbable. The circumstances of the 1920's are lacking in the 1960's. Four decades ago no great power was claiming world leadership or trying to save the world from Sin, least of all the United States which had rejected Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations and was busily engaged in minding

⁶ See Fred J. Cook, *The Warfare State* (New York: Macmillan, 1962).

its own business. Today Washington, along with Moscow and Peking, is dedicated to such leadership and the global triumph of Virtue over Vice. In the 1920's, no great power relied on arms spending to promote prosperity. Today...?⁶ In the 1920's, no group of national policy makers threatened global war over recurrent international crises. In the 1950's and 1960's this has become a not infrequent tactic.

The human community has failed altogether over these wasted decades to achieve disarmament and has unwittingly committed itself to one war after another. The morals or lessons to be derived from the record will vary with the prejudices of the commentator. But it is reasonably clear that disarmament imposed by victors on vanquished is futile, short of genocide; that international inspection and control are fancies in a world of rival sovereignties; and that in such a world disarmament by international agreement is virtually impossible save under highly exceptional circumstances—pending general willingness to transform the state system into some semblance of world government in which national communities can rely for security not on armaments but on the rule of law.

Neither the calendar nor the clock can be turned back. The only successful agreement among great powers to reduce and limit armaments in 65 years cannot be recaptured or repeated in our own troubled time. New approaches are called for. They have not yet emerged.

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Although this observer says that the United Nations is not yet a viable instrument through which to procure disarmament or establish weapons control, it has nonetheless, through its peace-keeping operations, "avoided a direct confrontation between the two great nuclear powers and has thus far prevented World War III."

The Role of the United Nations

By MARION H. MCVITTY
United Nations Representative for the World Federalists

THE CHARTER of the United Nations was conceived in the midst of World War II and was completed before the first atomic bomb was used. As a result, the United Nations Charter provisions are strong on collective military measures, and short on national disarmament programs.

The United Nations Charter calls for armed contingents of member states to be put at the disposal of the Security Council which can order their deployment to take "preventive or enforcement action" in the event of a "threat to, or breach of, world peace." The Charter established a Military Staff Committee composed of representatives of the armed forces of the five permanent members of the Council. United States, Soviet, British, French and Chinese military officers on this Military Staff Committee were to plan and, if need be, command a United Nations collective force. It was expected that contingents of land, sea and air forces from the five great powers would be constantly available to the United Nations.

Experience with the impotent League of Nations impelled the United Nations Founding Fathers to give detailed attention to collective security through collective armed force. The subject of disarmament, shopworn by countless negotiations between the two World Wars, got short shrift in the United Nations Charter.

The United Nations General Assembly "may consider . . . principles governing disarmament and the regulations of armaments." The Security Council was made "responsible for formulating . . . plans . . . for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments."

Whether the United Nations has armed forces at its disposal, and whether nation states do or do not, it is recognized that the peaceful settlement of international disputes is also essential to a world without war. The United Nations Charter lists at least seven methods by which nations may resolve their differences by pacific means. The International Court of Justice is a major organ of the United Nations, and its Statute is appended to the Charter.

Any operative agency can be only as effective as its sources of revenue permit. The United Nations Charter provides in Article 17 that, "The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the members as apportioned by the General Assembly." This stipulation is reinforced by a penalty for default. Article 19 says, "A member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years."

The constitutional provisions notwithstanding, it is instructive to note that in the 19 years of its existence the United Nations has planned little, and done much, with peace-keeping forces, while it has planned much, and done little, about disarmament.

EVOLUTION AT WORK

The evolutionary process may have been working on the United Nations Charter provisions for disarmament in theory, but in practice the control of national weapons has yet to be undertaken by the United Nations. From the introduction of the Baruch Plan in 1946 to the present, disarmament proposals have envisaged creation of a special United Nations Agency for arms inspection and control. Of course, no disarmament plan has yet reached that stage, but it seems to be generally agreed that the United Nations as presently constituted could not assume responsibility for regulating armaments.

Procedurally, disarmament negotiating bodies have waxed and waned from the Security Council to a United Nations Disarmament Commission composed of all United Nations members, and back to smaller committees only tenuously related to the United Nations. In short, attitudes may have been changed by nuclear developments, but programs and agencies have not yet emerged.

The phrase "peace-keeping machinery" has been coined to express the complex of United Nations police actions, United Nations treatment of international disputes which create emergencies, and the political, legal, executive and financial aspects of United Nations performance in crisis situations. From the outset, the evolutionary process has been strongly at work on this United Nations "peace-keeping machinery."

From the first, the Military Staff Committee could not agree on the composition of national contingents that should be available to the United Nations. Indeed, agreement among the Big Five was found to be unobtainable on almost any serious issue brought to the Security Council. The "unanimity rule" in the Council was modified in practice so that if a permanent member abstained on a

vote it did not count as a veto. However, this did not help the Military Staff Committee, and a negative vote by any permanent member remained capable of dooming action endorsed by a Council majority.

The fortuitous nature of the short-lived Soviet absence which permitted Security Council action on Korea prompted the next evolutionary development. The "Uniting for Peace Resolution" was adopted to make United Nations Assembly action possible when, in the face of an emergency, the Security Council was paralyzed by its voting procedure.

The General Assembly is limited by the Charter to recommendatory action. Unlike the Security Council, it is not permitted to use coercion. In consequence, when the Uniting for Peace Resolution was invoked at the time of Suez, it was necessary for the United Nations General Assembly to create a new type of United Nations police force and a new concept of United Nations collective security.

The role of the United Nations Secretary-General was broadened in scope. In 1956 he began to take over the task of the deadlocked Military Staff Committee, and to become through "quiet diplomacy" the Organization's number one impartial peacemaker.

PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

At the time of the North Korean aggression (in the temporary absence of the U.S.S.R.) the United Nations Security Council was able to decide to put collective armed forces into combat on the side of the victim, South Korea. Since the Military Staff Committee was inoperative, the United States was appointed to command the Korean forces in the name of the United Nations. At their own expense, 16 states took part in the collective action, but the United States, not the United Nations, was in control.

Ever since the aggression was repelled and a truce negotiated, the United Nations has sought to reunify Korea peacefully through a United Nations supervised expression of self-determination by the Korean people. It has been unsuccessful for a number of reasons, but one is paramount. An international organiza-

tion which has become one of the belligerents in a conflict is no longer an impartial agency in the eyes of all the parties. The United Nations had, in fact, disqualified itself from mediating the solution which it could not impose.

In the Suez emergency, the General Assembly created the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). From the outset, UNEF was on the side of law and order, not on the side of any belligerent. UNEF was directly under the command of the United Nations Secretary-General. The mandate controlling the use of this Force required the consent of the host country to its presence, and the voluntary contribution to United Nations service of contingents from non-aligned nations. It was a *peace* Force, forbidden to engage in combat, and having the right to use arms only in self-defense. UNEF was interposed between the belligerents to implement a ceasefire and withdrawal of the aggressor forces of Britain, France and Israel. It has remained in Gaza, and at certain points in Sinai, under the same terms, to police borders set by the Arab-Israel Armistice Agreement, and to help in keeping the area pacified.

When the Congo crisis erupted in 1960, the United Nations Security Council was able to act, since no permanent member vetoed the original resolutions. However, the Council did not invoke its coercive powers, but chose rather to adopt the method initiated by the Assembly at the time of Suez. Again the host country requested the United Nations Force, and the most impartial contingents available were contributed *ad hoc*. Again the Secretary-General was given the mandate to carry out this emergency policing operation. In spite of all the difficulties encountered by ONUC,¹ it was, to the best of human ability, an impartial Peace Force acting to preserve law and order. When one of ONUC's Field Commanders was asked how action with a United Nations Peace Force differed from action with a national armed force, he replied, "There is no enemy."

In March, 1964, the United Nations Se-

curity Council voted unanimously to send out another United Nations Peace Force to cope with the crisis on Cyprus. Once more the Council declined to use its coercive powers. At the request of the Cyprus government, contingents from nations not involved in the conflict were directed, under the command of the Secretary-General, to restore law and order, and to preserve world peace—but not to take sides.

FINANCIAL PROBLEMS

UNEF and ONUC troops were voted, assembled and dispatched before the United Nations made any provision to pay the cost of these expensive (in United Nations terms) emergency operations. Months later in each case, the United Nations Assembly decided that they must be financed by assessments apportioned by the Assembly on all members according to their regular United Nations budget shares. Because of hardship on the underdeveloped nations, their percentages were reduced and voluntary contributions from those better able to pay were permitted to make up the difference.

Political and legal claims have been used by the Soviet bloc, France and others to justify their refusal to pay their allotted shares for UNEF or ONUC. Soviet insistence that only the Security Council could apportion collective security costs, and France's claim that the Assembly could recommend, but could not compel, any action, even financial, on peace-keeping measures, led to a request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. The Court advised that the costs of UNEF and ONUC constitute expenses of the organization in terms of Charter Article 17. The Court's opinion was endorsed by a very substantial majority of the General Assembly. Thus the basic principle was established that there must be collective financial responsibility for collective political decisions regarding collective security.

Nonetheless, the financial dispute has remained obdurate, and at this writing, the United Nations has unpaid obligations of at least \$135,000,000. The Soviet Union and a number of other nations are liable to the

¹ The United Nations operation in the Congo.

penalty for default.

The United Nation's financial situation has become so precarious that later United Nations peace-keeping operations have not been financed according to the principle established by the Court and the Assembly.

By prior agreement with the Secretary-General, the two governments concerned with West Irian, and the two involved in Yemen have assumed the costs of those limited United Nations operations. In the case of Cyprus the original resolution made the inequitable and crippling stipulation that United Nations Forces for Cyprus must be financed by nations contributing contingents and by such voluntary contributions as the Secretary-General might receive.

Although the United Nations pacified the dispute in the Middle East, it has not been able to settle it. In Congo, the crisis was not so much due to an international dispute as to an internal problem aggravated by external intervention from several quarters. The United Nations Civilian Operation in Congo sought to overcome the internal problem by United Nations economic and technical aid, but lacked resources adequate to the need. The Secretary-General, with the help of an impartial individual mediator, resolved the dispute between Indonesia and Netherlands over possession of West Irian. The original Cyprus mandate authorized the Secretary-General to appoint a mediator agreeable to the parties, and to pay this United Nations mediator's expenses from United Nations funds. Evidently, it was hoped that in the case of the conflict in Cyprus, successful pacification and an agreed settlement would go hand in hand.

The evolutionary process at work on United Nations peace-keeping machinery would seem to have raised almost as many problems as it has sought to solve. Constitutionality has been disputed. Political disaffection is evidenced. The impartiality and integrity of the Secretary-General and the United Nations civil service have been attacked. Financial insolvency has resulted. United Nations Peace Forces have been pinned down for long periods in various trouble spots for lack

of real settlements of the disputes involved.

Yet, by its peace-keeping operations, the United Nations has avoided a direct confrontation between the two great nuclear powers, and has thus far prevented World War III. Furthermore, something has evolved in the United Nations which cannot be measured in dollars and cents, or evaluated in terms of politics as "the art of the possible." In the course of the events described—whether as cause, or effect—the world community has apparently developed a more enlightened attitude toward collective security, and an expectation that it will be pursued henceforth by means more morally acceptable.

Since the United Nations went to war to stop a war in Korea, world public opinion has seemed to find it as immoral for the world organization to decide an issue by combat as for individual nations to settle their own disputes by the use of national armed force. By dint of circumstances, ingenuity and liberal Charter interpretation, pacification of conflicts by United Nations Police Forces has been separated from determining the outcome of the cause. Thus the impartial restoration of law and order does not prejudice the terms of a peaceful settlement of the original dispute.

United Nations members, including the United States, indicate by their behavior that there is a "cultural lag" between the development of the new theory of United Nations collective security and their individual reactions to it. United Nations members, particularly major powers, continue to oppose a United Nations Peace Force in being, insisting instead on the cumbersome assemblage of voluntary contingents *ad hoc*. They are unwilling to accept a permanent special scale of assessments on all members to finance future United Nations emergency operations. There is a tendency, even among Western governments, to scramble back from the Uniting for Peace Resolution, lest it be invoked by a majority of "irresponsible" new nations. These devices to avoid national commitments for the men and the money essential to United Nations peace-keeping capabilities suggest that nations continue to fear that collective

security forces may still subdue their sovereign rights by collective military power.

The implications of the new moral concept in the worldwide body politic, and of its implementation in future United Nations collective security measures, should evoke a different response. An unlawfully ambitious state might still fear that the new type of United Nations Peace Force would thwart it in an attempt to aggrandize its power and influence. All United Nations members should realize, nonetheless, that a properly directed Peace Force under the new terms cannot damage the *legitimate* interests of any nation.

Surely, when the "cultural lag" is overtaken by the understanding that United Nations peace-keeping methods need no longer threaten to decide controversies by armed force, United Nations members will take a more constructive approach to the further development of United Nations peace-keeping capabilities.

FUTURE POSSIBILITIES

Basically, the new collective security concept implies the substitution of law and law enforcement, not only between nations, but by the United Nations itself. It is difficult to see how United Nations peace-keeping machinery can become fully effective in this sense apart from general and complete disarmament and without constitutional changes to redefine and augment the authority of the United Nations to enforce world peace through world law. In the immediate future, however, what is needed is a bridge between *ad hoc* practice and constitutional reform.

The required elements of such an intermediate stage are clear, and clearly interrelated.

1. A small, but effective, United Nations Peace Force in being should be individually recruited and trained by the United Nations in mixed units, so that it would be appropriate in composition for any trouble spot, and constantly available when needed.

2. Legal guidelines should be agreed upon to govern the use of United Nations Peace Forces by formulating the temporary powers the United Nations will need to control its

troops and to carry out each mandate effectively with a defined minimum use of force.

3. An equitable, special scale of assessments to be apportioned by the Assembly on all members should be agreed upon for financing United Nations emergency operations in future.

4. Teams of skilled fact finders and experienced mediators should be developed and remain readily available to assist the efforts for the settlement of international disputes by just and peaceful means.

If the United Nations peace-keeping capabilities could be strengthened by such a consolidation of past experience and clearer definition of the new concepts and methods, sufficient confidence might thus be generated to permit the United Nations to control comparable first steps in arms reduction. Thereafter, progress toward a reliable international security system and national disarmament might proceed simultaneously.

That process is unlikely to proceed very far, however, before it is recognized that endowing an international organization with the powers requisite to the end in view raises questions as to the precise nature of the authority which is to wield such powers. It must then follow that in the second half of the twentieth century the affairs of men and nations cannot be ordered adequately by a preatomic United Nations Charter and by nineteenth century diplomacy. The time will have come to revise the United Nations, to set up a new authority by a new treaty, or to combine the two into an integrated and viable authority capable of maintaining both unity and diversity.

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"Postwar disarmament negotiations have . . . indicated a growing consensus on some of the basic issues of disarmament," notes this specialist, in his analysis of the progress and of the main points at issue in the East-West discussion of arms control since 1945.

Postwar Disarmament Negotiations

By LLOYD JENSEN

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PROBABLY NO TOPIC of international import has been more recurrent in diplomatic negotiations than that of disarmament. But despite the millions of words spoken on the subject, we still appear to be a long way from agreement. There have, of course, been moments of hope along with periods of utter frustration. It is this meandering character of the postwar disarmament negotiations which will provide our focus.

The character of the negotiating body has been as great a bone of contention as have the more substantive questions concerning disarmament. During the early postwar years the Security Council of the United Nations served as the basis for negotiation, since both the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments were composed of the membership of the Security Council plus Canada. These two bodies were combined in 1952 in the Disarmament Commission which was gradually expanded, at the insistence of the Soviet Union, to include the total membership of the United Nations. Obviously a body of this size is not conducive to bargaining.

The more successful negotiations were held in the five-nation Disarmament Subcommittee from 1954 to 1957. There have also been other negotiating bodies, and generally greater progress has been made in the smaller organs. The nuclear test ban treaty agreed upon in

the summer of 1963, for example, was developed in negotiations involving only the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. Currently, negotiations are being held in the seventeen-nation Disarmament Conference¹ which is composed of four Western nations, five Soviet bloc members, and eight "uncommitted nations."

Aside from the more propagandistically-oriented phase of the disarmament negotiations in which each side tries to demonstrate to the world that it seriously wants disarmament, the debates have focused upon the discussion of specific proposals made by each side for doing something about the dangers of the armaments race. The task of formulating a disarmament proposal is not an easy one, for it involves evaluations of existing and potential military strength, of the positions of the opposition, and of allied and neutral opinion; it requires also the construction of an image of the future as it might be under both disarmament and armament. Choices must be made with regard to what weapons systems should be included, whether armaments should be reduced or merely regulated, what measures may be used for regulating the armaments race, and how these measures should be staged. A quick glance at the proposals for disarmament since 1945 indicates that a major preoccupation has been the question of regulating nuclear weapons.

Although one can divide the postwar discussions on nuclear disarmament in a variety

¹ France dropped out of the conference, first known as the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference.

of ways, I find it useful to distinguish among three basic periods. The first is that of the Baruch Plan which lasted until September 9, 1955, at which time the United States placed a reservation upon its previous proposals. The second period might be called the period of indecision as both sides maneuvered for a new position on disarmament. It was an era in which partial measures predominated—a time in which both sides were rethinking the feasibility and desirability of nuclear disarmament. The final period encompasses the proposals for general and complete disarmament beginning with the Soviet proposals of September 19, 1959.

THE BARUCH PLAN

The Baruch Plan, named after elder statesman Bernard Baruch, who served as the initial United States postwar disarmament negotiator, was the first United States proposal attempting to do something about the monster which it had unleashed at Nagasaki and Hiroshima. It was a partial plan in the sense that it affected only nuclear weapons. Further, it did not outlaw research and production of all atomic weapons, for the control organ would still be able to develop and produce such weapons.

The Soviet response to the Baruch Plan was one of great hostility. The Russians insisted upon the total abolition of atomic weapons within a period of three months, rather than a phased reduction of fissionable materials and atomic stockpiles, as provided in the Baruch Plan.

The view has been widely held that the Baruch Plan was a most generous offer to the Soviets since the United States in effect was voluntarily relinquishing its monopoly over atomic weapons. However, further reflection demonstrates that we were asking the Soviets to give up a great deal. We were asking them to trust us to a considerable extent since we had the knowledge of the atomic bomb, whereas they did not. (Their first detected test did not take place until 1949.) Furthermore, an International Authority was to be established to control the future of the bomb.

This would obviously mean that the Soviets would be in a permanent minority and would have to trust the decisions made by the United States and its allies. Voting in various United Nations organs had already demonstrated this fact of international life to them.

Despite the complete unacceptability of the plan for the Soviets, the United States officially continued to support the Baruch Plan until Harold Stassen was appointed to head the United States disarmament efforts in 1955. Almost immediately Stassen placed a reservation upon all previous American proposals, and nearly two years transpired before a new position could be developed. However, there were indications of a change of policy prior to that time. In the early 1950's, the United States began to assert that it was only supporting the Baruch Plan until some better proposal was suggested. In 1953, the United States moved from an emphasis upon nuclear production and possession bans to President Dwight Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace proposal. According to this plan, certain amounts of fissionable materials would be diverted from weaponry purposes to peaceful uses. However, it was never anticipated that this diversion would be particularly large, and the plan can hardly be viewed as a nuclear disarmament scheme.

By 1955, American and Soviet nuclear weapon stockpiles were believed to have grown so large that the United States felt it necessary to modify its position even further on the question of a nuclear possession ban. Many scientists felt that the reliability of methods for detecting hidden stocks was so low as to create a genuine risk to American security if the other side should decide to hide some of its weapons. This idea was not a new one, since Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer had grimly reported ten years earlier that it would take a screwdriver to detect a nuclear device hidden in a wooden box. But with the growth in Soviet stockpiles, the risk of evasion was viewed as intolerable. The Soviet representatives admitted the difficulty of this problem in their May 10, 1955, proposals. Despite this admission, the Soviets continued to push for a ban on the possession of nuclear weapons

as well as for a ban upon their production. The United States resisted all such proposals until verbally acquiescing to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament in 1960.

The dangers presented by nuclear weapons have been intensified by the development of rapid means of delivery. Since the warning time for nuclear missiles has been reduced to a period of 30 minutes, the incentives for surprise attack have increased. Consequently, in recent years the disarmament debates have concentrated upon minimizing the dangers of surprise attack and upon developing arms control measures which can help stabilize deterrence. Jules Moch, the long-time French disarmament negotiator, urged his colleagues to devise ways of restraining the development of missiles before they also reached "the point of no return" as had nuclear weapons by 1955. If such restraints could have been developed, there would not be the problem of hidden stockpiles, which has plagued the nuclear disarmament negotiations. The accuracy and nuclear pay-load capacities of the missiles might also have been restricted. Unfortunately, his words were not heeded, and the advanced technology of missile development as well as past production are now serious problems.

Opportunists from the Soviet Union have seen the question of delivery systems as a way of dividing the Western allies. Hence, they have supported French concern over the problem by insisting in their general and complete disarmament plans that missiles be destroyed completely in the first stage of a disarmament agreement.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

Despite the greater preoccupation with nuclear disarmament during the postwar negotiations, conventional disarmament has also received its share of attention. Generally, bargaining for conventional disarmament has developed into a "numbers game" in which a certain percentage reduction or a ceiling would be placed upon armed forces. Other conventional weapons would then be "reduced accordingly."

The early debate concerning force levels

was involved with the question of whether a ceiling on forces ought to be established or whether there ought to be a percentage reduction. The Russians opted for the latter, as they clung to the concept of a one-third reduction of forces and conventional weapons, but they finally accepted the concept of a ceiling in 1955. In fact, the famous May 10, 1955, Soviet proposal would have accepted ceilings of 1 to 1.5 million men each for the United States, China, and the Soviet Union, as the Western nations had proposed only three years earlier. Apparently the Russians were concerned about the rearmament of Germany which was rapidly taking place, and felt it necessary to reverse their stand on conventional disarmament in order to forestall such a possibility. The American response, through Harold Stassen, was one of placing a reservation upon its previous disarmament proposals, as indicated above. Needless to say, this placed the United States in a difficult light as far as world public opinion was concerned, for just as soon as the Russians had accepted important aspects of the Western conventional disarmament proposals, the United States shifted its position.

Having reserved its position upon previous conventional disarmament proposals, the United States did not again support levels as low as 1 to 1.5 million until its first general and complete disarmament proposal of March, 1960, which envisioned an eventual reduction to levels consistent only with internal security.

PROGRESS, 1956-1957

Despite the initial impediment of the United States reservation in 1955, disarmament negotiations in 1956 and 1957 were among the most promising of the entire post-war period. By the fall of 1957, the two sides had agreed to a three-stage reduction of armed forces to an ultimate level of 1.7 million. Substantial consensus had been reached concerning the specific procedures to be used during the first stage of the disarmament agreement. Unfortunately, the optimism generated in 1957 was only momentary, because the Soviet Union began to press for general

and complete disarmament in the fall of 1959.

Verbal consensus on general and complete disarmament appears to be high. It is difficult for a state to object to this concept as long as the other side supports it. If a state did oppose general and complete disarmament, it would be open to propaganda charges that it was not serious about disarmament. Debate on the subject therefore has tended to revolve around the question of how rapidly and in which stages armaments should be reduced. Soviet proposals for a four-year transition period have been completely unacceptable to the United States. Instead, the United States has proposed a three-stage reduction plan to extend over a period of nine years.

It is interesting to note that the United States in its recent proposals has accepted percentage reductions of conventional armaments and forces despite the vehement objections leveled at Soviet proposals for a one-third reduction of weapons in the late 1940's and early 1950's. American proposals submitted in 1962 recommended a 30 per cent reduction of most conventional weapons and delivery systems in the first stage of the disarmament agreement. Perhaps the basic difference is the fact that the Soviets refused to accept a staged reduction of all armaments. The one-third reduction proposal was not then part of a broader disarmament agreement for the Soviet Union adamantly rejected the concept of staging until after the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953.

The progress of future negotiations will depend in large measure upon the success in obtaining agreement upon the order and speed of arms reductions. It is not enough to agree upon the desirability of reducing weapons. Unfortunately, each side wants the other to reduce its areas of strength first. Thus, most Soviet proposals for disarmament have called for the abolition of all foreign bases in the first stage of the disarmament agreement.

An equally difficult problem in the disarmament negotiations has been that of inspection and control. The position of the Soviet Union with regard to this issue has fluctuated

considerably over the years. Soviet proposals in 1946 called only for "national inspection" under any nuclear disarmament agreement, but, by 1960, Premier Nikita Khrushchev was quoted as saying that if general and complete disarmament were adopted, he would accept whatever proposals the United States would make regarding inspection and control measures. However, the crucial point of difference has been at what stage in the disarmament scheme the control provisions would be instituted. The United States has generally insisted that the control organ be in existence and operating before any weapons are reduced. It is contended that only in this way can the reductions be verified in order to guarantee that both sides are abiding by the agreement. The Soviet position, on the other hand, has usually been that the reductions should precede the inspection function. The Soviets have been particularly fearful that the Western nations would use the excuse of international inspection as a means to uncover military secrets. The issue has never been settled despite vague verbal consensus that the reduction of armaments and inspection provisions should be instituted simultaneously.

Although there are many differences with respect to the inspection system, the Soviets have made a number of concessions from their initial recalcitrant position. In 1947, the Soviets agreed to periodic international inspection, and, in 1949, they verbally accepted what they called "continuous inspection." The real breakthrough, however, came in the famous May, 1955, proposals when the Soviet Union agreed to the establishment of ground control posts on the basis of reciprocity at major highways, railroad intersections, ports, and airfields.

Despite this major shift by the Soviet Union, the United States acted as if it were making a concession by accepting the Soviet proposal for control posts and urged in return that the U.S.S.R. accept aerial inspection. Aerial inspection was the cornerstone of President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal which he presented at the Geneva Summit Conference in 1955. Initial Soviet reaction was one of considerable hostility. The Rus-

sians argued that such a proposal would not end the arms race; that it would be a threat to their sovereignty; and that it would increase distrust, particularly when one side or the other found itself behind in the armaments race.

In 1956, the Soviets accepted the concept of aerial inspection but wanted such inspection limited to only a part of the territories of the United States and the Soviet Union. The subsequent debates involved the drawing of maps for reciprocal aerial inspection in which each side attempted to include those areas believed to cover the important military installations of the opposition.

DECISION-MAKING AND CONTROL

The postwar disarmament negotiations have also included considerable discussion of the decision-making powers of the control organ. Baruch was insistent that the veto not be made applicable to the decisions of the control organ, because this would enable the Soviets to forestall its operations. Most Soviet proposals have provided that the control organ be established within the framework of the Security Council which is equivalent to demanding a veto over the decisions of that body. Admittedly, the Soviet Union conceded the possibility that day-to-day decisions might be made by a majority, but it is extremely doubtful that any very crucial questions would be resolved in this manner.

For example, it is not clear in any of the Soviet proposals whether important decisions, such as dispatching inspection teams, determining whether a plant is eligible for inspection, or determining the frequency and routing of aerial flights, could be made by majority decision. The impression that one gets from reading the debates and proposals is that such questions as these would be subject to a veto. Majority decisions would probably be reserved for more mundane matters, such as personnel problems, minor expenditures, or procedural questions.

Although there appears to be considerable consensus at the verbal level concerning the principles and needs of an inspection system, whenever the two states attempt to become

more specific the negotiations tend to stalemate. There are many questions involving staffing as well as the powers of the control organ which have never been settled. The most neglected matter in this regard has been the question of what is to be done in case a violation is detected by the control organ.

The official United States position has completed a full circle on the enforcement issue. The Baruch Plan emphasized enforcement measures, including the use of physical sanctions in case of violations of the treaty. There followed a period when American proposals emphasized the threat of withdrawal from the agreement as the main deterrent to violation. The assumption made was that both sides would view the agreement as mutually advantageous or they would not have entered into it in the first place. That is, they would be unlikely to violate the agreement, for such behavior would provide the other side with a legitimate excuse to abrogate the treaty. To complete the circle, the United States has returned to physical sanctions in its general and complete disarmament proposals—sanctions which call for the establishment of an international force to police the disarmament agreement. It would seem that the greater the amount of disarmament proposed, the more extensive are the recommended enforcement measures.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has generally objected to the creation of a permanent international police force. Evidence of this can be found in the negotiations for placing national contingents at the disposal of the United Nations Security Council in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter. However, in the Soviet Union's general and complete disarmament proposal of June 2, 1960, the Soviets conceded the possibility of having states place contingents of militia at the disposal of the Security Council.

Postwar disarmament negotiations have
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Lloyd Jensen wrote his doctoral thesis at the University of Michigan on *The Postwar Disarmament Negotiations* and is the author of several articles on the subject of disarmament.

Reviewing the developments leading up to the nuclear test ban treaty signed in August, 1963, and evaluating its effect, this writer says, "The present limited [test ban] treaty is an important advance but its ultimate value will have to be judged more by developments that may stem from it than by what it has accomplished so far."

The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

By RICHARD S. PRESTON
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THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN treaty¹ is widely considered to be the most significant accomplishment of 18 cold war years of negotiation on weapons control, and one of the most significant international agreements since World War II. The treaty is very popular. Worldwide sentiment in favor of it had been growing for nine years. In addition to the three original signatories over 100 nations acceded to it almost immediately. The United States Senate ratified it by a vote of 80 to 19, and public opinion polls showed overwhelming support for it.

This enthusiasm for a test ban reflects a widespread yearning to make nuclear war less likely and less devastating, and to put an end to radioactive fallout from nuclear testing. The treaty itself does little to satisfy this yearning. It is not a disarmament treaty, and it puts no restrictions on the arms race except for the prohibition of test explosions too large to be confined underground. It does not settle any outstanding issue of the cold war. Furthermore, France and China are not bound by the treaty; if nothing else prevents them, they certainly are quite likely to retrace the whole process by which the United States, Great Britain, and Russia perfected multi-megaton weapons, thereby exposing the world to a whole new generation of fallout.

Nevertheless, the signing of a test ban treaty may prove to have been a turning point in international relations. In assessing the significance of the test ban and trying to see what consequences may arise from it, it will be useful to review the development of the concept of the test ban.

The single bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 released 1000 times as much energy as the largest of the conventional bombs of World War II. The significance of this new dimension of military destructive capability soon became widely understood. For a number of years, the major powers debated in the United Nations about techniques for limiting or eliminating nuclear weaponry. Eventually a wide range of proposals for arms limitation came under discussion, and since the early 1950's both arms reduction and complete disarmament have been subjects of East-West negotiation. During most of this time, however, the United States, the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. all worked to build up their nuclear strength. Whether or not they were negotiating in good faith, all were afraid to begin arms reduction except from a position of military parity, or, hopefully, superiority. Also, in view of the existing contention between East and West, it is not surprising that all concerned tried to maintain their military capabilities at a high level.

Early in the negotiations, a basic pattern

¹ For the text of the treaty see *Current History*, Vol. 45, No. 266 (October, 1963), pp 235-236, 243.

of disagreement on the principles of weapons control emerged. It became clear that the United States would always insist on inspection to verify that the terms of an agreement were being carried out. The United States was afraid to undertake any mutual arms reduction without assurance at every step that the other side was also complying. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, would always view inspection as a threat to the secrecy it considers indispensable for military security. Arguing that inspection would provide opportunities for outsiders to spy, the U.S.S.R. would permit inspection only at a late stage in general disarmament.

The advent of the fusion bomb started a second nuclear revolution in warfare and brought new urgency to the problem of controlling the nuclear arms race. For, although the Hiroshima fission bomb released 1000 times as much energy as the largest of conventional bombs, a fusion bomb (H-bomb) can release 1000 times as much energy as the Hiroshima bomb. When the possibility of developing H-bombs began to be seriously considered in the United States, a number of government officials and advisers privately urged that an agreement be sought with the Soviet Union to refrain from developing and testing these new weapons. They argued that test explosions of the new super bombs would be impossible to conceal even if no inspections were permitted. Thus, a simple agreement might make it possible to avoid entering a new phase of vastly increased military destructive capacity. Unfortunately, this approach was not attempted and, as we shall see, a valuable opportunity was lost. The first hydrogen "device" was exploded by the United States in 1952. The U.S.S.R. followed suit in 1953, and the United Kingdom in 1957.

There had been no strong public sentiment for an end to nuclear tests since just after World War II. But in 1954 heavy radioactive fallout from H-bomb explosions became a major international issue. This, coupled with the possibility that a cessation of H-bomb tests could still set a limit on the ultimate destructiveness of nuclear warfare,

prompted calls from many parts of the world for a ban on H-bomb tests. In the course of the continuing disarmament negotiations, Russia began to propose a ban on all nuclear tests, but without inspection. The United States at first refused to enter into separate negotiations for a test ban on the grounds that the cessation of tests was an integral part of general disarmament, which was already being discussed, and should not be treated as an independent item.

By 1958, the positions of both sides had been modified to the point where detailed discussions of a comprehensive test ban could begin. The West agreed to discuss the test ban separately from other disarmament matters, and the U.S.S.R. agreed to consider the technical requirements of international verification and control of a test ban.

When the United States entered into the test ban phase of disarmament negotiations, approval by American military, political and scientific experts was not at all unanimous. The arguments for and against a test ban were fairly well crystalized by that time, and it will be appropriate to consider them at this time.

TEST BAN OPPONENTS

The chief points of argument against United States participation in a test ban treaty are four. First, a test ban by itself would be worthless since it would have no effect on the production, stockpiling or eventual use of existing types of nuclear weapons.

Second, it would be foolhardy to trust Russia not to cheat if it could. Detection of all tests down to arbitrarily small sizes is obviously impossible, regardless of the monitoring system used. Concealed tests of small devices could lead to technical advances that would tilt the military balance in Russia's favor. The United States cannot afford to take this risk.

Third, the only safe position for the United States is one of military superiority. Continued strength requires continued efforts to improve our own nuclear capability by developing, testing, and deploying any kind of weapon, large or small, offensive or defensive,

that might be militarily useful. We must continue testing.

Fourth, the fallout problem has been over-emphasized. The harmful effects of global fallout are not large enough to be observable statistically in whole populations, to say nothing of the impossibility of identifying these effects in particular individuals. Fallout is one of the minor hazards we live with. The harm it does is a small price to pay for security.

That there must have been similar misgivings in Russia may be judged from the fact that the U.S.S.R. broke an early, self-imposed unilateral moratorium on tests just as serious test ban negotiations were about to start. The U.S.S.R. was also the first to break the spell of the famous long moratorium and resume tests in 1961.

TEST BAN PROONENTS

Proponents of the test ban rejected the notion that continued safety could be gained by either side in a nuclear arms race. First, the concept of nuclear superiority is becoming progressively less and less meaningful militarily; by conventional standards an all-out nuclear war between strong nuclear powers would be catastrophic for both sides, even if they were not very evenly matched. While temporary advantages in offensive or defensive capability may, from time to time, tilt the balance to one side or the other, on the average the devastation that would be suffered by both sides, as well as by the rest of the world, can only increase with time.

Second, while we may hope that the arms race will turn into a permanent stalemate in which neither side will dare use its nuclear weapons, such a stalemate would be undependable. The frightful possibility would remain that existing nuclear arsenals could be brought into use, either suddenly as a result of miscalculation, accident, desperation, or madness, or more slowly by escalation from a conventional war.

Third, the only permanent solution to the problem is the elimination of all nuclear weapons. It may be that this can only be accomplished by total disarmament, or it may

be that it cannot be accomplished at all. Nevertheless we must explore every possible approach to this goal including preliminary steps such as workable agreements on arms limitation, arms reduction, and other arms control measures.

Fourth, one possible first step is an agreement to ban nuclear tests. It is not a large step. It would stop neither the production of existing weapons nor the development of new uses and new means of delivery for them. It would cause very little disturbance of present military trends, unfortunately, but it would cause no sudden shift in the strategic balance, either. Therefore it is a first step with a good chance of being agreed upon.

Fifth, in assessing the risks inherent in this or any similar step we must keep in mind the staggering risks involved in a continuation of the nuclear arms race.

Although proponents of a test ban conceded that its direct effect on the arms race would be small, they advanced other reasons for concentrating on getting a test ban treaty:

1) It would put a stop to the development of ever more frightful weapons of mass destruction.

2) The nuclear powers have thus far refrained from nuclear warfare, but the peace is unstable. The instability will be larger when there are a larger number of nuclear powers involved. Therefore it is important to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to nations that do not yet have them. Some non-nuclear nations would be quick to join in a test ban agreement, and others would be less willing. But certainly the incentives and pressures for other nations to forego their own testing programs would be greater if the present nuclear nations have halted their own development programs.

3) The arms race is a reaction to mistrust and suspicion, much of it justified. But the arms buildup aggravates the mistrust and suspicion, which in turn accelerates the arms race even faster. A test ban could help break this vicious circle both because of its small direct decelerating effect on the arms buildup, and because a demonstration by each side that it is making a genuine effort to reverse

the trend should help to reduce the mistrust and suspicion.

4) Workable international control and inspection procedures would have to be developed for a test ban. If and when more comprehensive arms control measures are agreed on, it will be useful to have the valuable experience and precedent of the test ban control system to draw upon.

5) A test ban would cut off the source of fallout. Although there are only a few known cases of injury to humans that can be traced directly to fallout from testing, there is wide agreement among competent authorities that fallout is harmful. This might be considered a reasonable price to pay for military security except for two considerations. It is questionable whether this sacrifice can buy real security. And, since fallout is worldwide, it affects whole populations which have no choice in the matter. This has been a continuing cause of international bad feeling, and it would be well to eliminate it.

PROBLEMS OF MONITORING

A conference of technical experts met in Geneva in 1958 to consider methods of monitoring a test ban. The conference discussed detection, identification and verification of nuclear explosions in space, at various altitudes in the atmosphere, at the earth's surface, underwater and underground. The experts were able to agree that a worldwide network of 180 monitoring stations, each equipped with a number of special devices, would be able to detect and identify all explosions down to sizes equivalent to a few kilotons (KT) unless they were underground or at very high altitudes.

There were data on only one underground test at that time, but it appeared that the lower limit for detection of underground explosions would be about 5 KT. Even at 5 KT the identification would not be very reliable. Underground tests can be detected at large distances only by seismographs. Analysis of seismic signals can quite reliably distinguish between large earthquakes and large explosions, but the distinction tends to become ambiguous for weak signals. Furthermore,

earthquakes that give as strong signals as a 5 KT explosion are fairly frequent. This meant that an actual explosion of this strength might be merely one of a large number of poorly identified events that would be detected in a year's time, all but this one being part of a large background of natural events.

Further information about any unidentified event would have to be obtained from an on-site inspection. A team of experts would have to go to the approximate location of the suspicious event as determined from the seismic data. There they would use a number of techniques, none completely reliable, to find the most likely spots to start drilling or digging in the search for the radioactive debris of a possible nuclear explosion.

In all environments the problem of detecting, identifying, and verifying is increasingly difficult when dealing with the smaller explosions. The problem for underground tests has received the most public attention because it is the most difficult. After the actual treaty negotiations started, a second technical conference met to consider further the problem of monitoring very high altitude tests, and agreed on a number of techniques. Then a third technical conference had to be called when American data on a last-minute series of underground tests by the United States indicated that previous estimates of the efficiency of detection and identification were too optimistic. The Russian delegation did not agree with the American interpretation of the data which now set the threshold for detection at 20 KT instead of 5 KT. Nor would the Russians accept new American calculations which predicted that seismic signals from an underground explosion could be weakened several hundredfold if the explosion were carried out in an enormous hole deep underground.

At the conclusion of the first conference of experts, and after a short flurry of tests by both sides which included a new series of underground tests by the United States, the long moratorium and the formal negotiations for a treaty began simultaneously in the fall of 1958. The history of the negotiations from 1958 to 1963 is a complicated one, replete with proposals and counter proposals. In

what follows it will be impossible to do more than sketch the most significant developments.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Agreement on a complete ban on tests was never reached. Predictably, the main obstacle to agreement was the question of onsite inspection of possible underground tests. It appeared to the United States that the uncertain but rather high threshold for detection and identification offered the U.S.S.R. an opportunity to carry out useful small tests in secret, while in the more "open" United States no such evasion would be possible. Therefore, the United States wanted a rather large number of on-site inspections per year inside the U.S.S.R. Since there would never be 100 per cent certainty of discovering a violation, the United States was relying on frequent inspections to deter a potential violation by increasing the risk of discovery. The U.S.S.R. held out for a small number of annual inspections out of fear that its military secrets would be compromised by more frequent inspections. There were disagreements over other matters such as which country would provide the staffs of monitoring stations inside the U.S.S.R., and how the international control commission would operate.

At the end of 1959, the United States declared itself free to resume tests, but did not do so. Negotiations dragged on, with interruptions, until late in 1961 when the U.S.S.R. finally resumed atmospheric testing. By this time there was so much agitation in the United States for the resumption of testing that it came as a surprise to many when the U.S.S.R. took upon itself the main burden of world resentment by testing first. The United States resumed underground testing 15 days later.

The new round of tests provided an opportunity for American scientists to try out some improvements and new ideas in monitoring techniques. The new techniques, combined with revised data on the rate of occurrence of earthquakes inside the Soviet Union, made the monitoring problem much easier. The United States took advantage of this by adopting a proposal for a test ban with no real in-

ternational control. Each country would maintain its own monitoring stations on territory under its own control or in countries friendly to it. Under this plan the United States and United Kingdom would need to have a few robot seismic stations ("black boxes") installed in special areas of the Soviet Union and would still need an annual quota of on-site inspections.

The U.S.S.R. agreed to all of this in principle. It seemed to be now or never for a test ban, but in the end there was a deadlock. The United States and the U.S.S.R. stood firm on seven and three on-site inspections, respectively.

SENATE ACTION

Even before this deadlock it was questionable whether the United States Senate would ratify a treaty with only seven inspections annually. Then in May, 1963, the Senate itself attempted to show the way out by passing a resolution calling for a treaty to ban all but underground tests. Similar proposals had already been turned down by the U.S.S.R. on several previous occasions; however, now the U.S.S.R. was receptive to the suggestion and it became the basis for the current limited test ban treaty which was signed in August, 1963.

The limited test ban was easy for both sides to accept. The U.S.S.R. would have no control posts, no on-site inspections, and no international commission with which to contend. The United States and the United Kingdom would not need to worry about undetected underground tests because they were to be permitted. Both sides are apparently satis-

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Pointing out that the "growing complexity and diversity of the world" make the chances of achieving "any widespread and specific disarmament agreements unlikely," this historian goes on to say that this independence and diversity "are a consequence of . . . growing feelings of security and . . . reduced fears." Paradoxically, he continues, "this decrease in fear and rise in security is the necessary preliminary of any arms control."

Weapons Control as Seen Abroad

By CARROLL QUIGLEY

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DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL have always been attractive to those who believed that these policies could assist the achievement of peace. There are several examples of this in the Old Testament, including the famous passage that swords be hammered into plowshares. But for thousands of years such demands were intermittent and individual. Only in the last two generations has concern with arms control become of sustained public interest. Popular demand for disarmament began to rise during the nineteenth century and most notably since the first Hague Conference of 1899.

The causes of this growing interest in disarmament show the reasons for the feeling today. There have been four factors behind it: first, the shift from professional armies of mercenary soldiers to mass armies of citizen soldiers which began about the time of the French Revolution and Napoleon (1789–1815). Second, a shift in the war aims of belligerent countries from limited, negotiable goals toward more and more extensive goals, until, ultimately, the demand for "total victory" included in it the wish to destroy, more or less completely, the way of life and even the physical existence of the enemy. Third, the development of "total war" as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution which mobilized increasing amounts of a

nation's resources and people into any war effort. Fourth, the increase in the power of weapons until they approached the ability to inflict total annihilation on all concerned, non-combatants as well as combatants, neutrals as well as belligerents, victors as well as vanquished. This cumulative evolution toward total victory, total mobilization and total annihilation provides the background for the present demand for peace and disarmament.

It is worth recognizing this process, because any reversal of the developments of the past century might satisfy, to some degree, the demand for disarmament merely by historical development without the need to reach any disarmament agreements with anyone. Such developments can already be discerned, to some extent, and might include: (1) a shift from mass armies of drafted citizens to smaller forces of professional, mercenary soldiers; (2) a shift in war aims from total victory to more specific and limited goals (such as occurred in the Korean War of 1950–1953); (3) an increase in the effectiveness of the defensive over the offensive in the development of weapons and tactics; and (4) a growing recognition by all concerned that the ultimate aims of any war, the conquest of the minds and the wills of one's opponents, can be achieved by non-violent as well as by violent methods. Somewhat related to this last point would be a growing recognition

that the purpose of war is not to destroy the lives of individual persons but to disintegrate the organizational structure of power in which they are arranged.

The task of working for disarmament became constant following the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, because that treaty, which imposed disarmament on Germany, made the German disarmament conditional on efforts by the victorious powers to seek universal disarmament. Efforts to carry out this promise were not successful, but they taught the world a very great deal about the nature of disarmament, the function of arms in human society, and the characteristics of some of the technical problems involved in disarmament.

These disarmament efforts of the 1920's and early 1930's were paralyzed by a basic difference of outlook between the English-speaking states, including the British Commonwealth and the United States, on the one side, and the European powers, led by France and Czechoslovakia, on the other. The two groups came to be known as "pacifists" and "realists."

PACIFISTS AND REALISTS

The pacifists insisted that armaments cause wars and that the proper way to disarm is to disarm. The realists argued that armaments are the result of war and the fear of war and that, accordingly, there must be a reduction in this fear and a corresponding increase in security before anyone could be expected to disarm. The pacifists advocated a direct or technical approach to disarmament by turning the task over to military experts who could arrange the terms for immediate, mutual reduction in armaments. The realists, on the other hand, felt that disarmament must be approached indirectly by first seeking political agreements which would so increase the feeling of security of the states concerned that they would be willing to reduce their armaments even before formal agreements were reached.

As one additional example of the wide difference of views between these two groups in the 1920's, we might mention that the English-speaking powers, in those days, in-

sisted that enforcement of any disarmament agreement could be based on "good faith," while the Continental powers, at that time, insisted that enforcement of disarmament must be based on inspection and some kind of international police powers.

Basically, this disagreement on procedure 40 years ago was a dispute over priority between security and disarmament. The pacifist countries wanted disarmament first, while the realist countries wanted security first. It is now clear that the realist countries were correct and that the pacifist countries, including the United States, were wrong. The pacifist countries, at that time, were willing to seek disarmament immediately because, in fact, they already had security themselves. They were so self-centered that they refused to see that France and its allies did not feel secure and were not able to disarm until political agreements increased their security. This fundamental relationship, and the error of the English-speaking position in the 1920's, are clear. These same English-speaking countries, in the 1950's, have refused Soviet invitations to disarm without adequate provisions for inspection, although they themselves tried to force France to accept this same type of proposal 40 years ago.

Of course, conditions have changed in the past 40 years, but the basic relationships between power, security, fear, armaments and the desire for higher standards of living (or other goals) have remained. Now, as then, these basic relationships and the positions of the different states with respect to these relationships must be understood before any efforts for disarmament or arms control can have much hope of success. Security (and its opposite, fear) rests on power (which is political) and no real progress toward disarmament or social welfare and other goals can be made unless security is increased and fear reduced. If this is true, we can see that the tense atmosphere of today's world has been unconducive to success in disarmament since the end of World War II.

At the end of World War II, the United States immediately demobilized the forces which had defeated Germany and Japan.

This left the Soviet Union's ground forces almost unchallenged on the great land-mass of Eurasia with no equivalent ground forces to limit its actions, since Germany lay prostrate to the west and both China and Japan were shattered to the east. At first the United States did not recognize the dangers of this near-monopoly of Soviet military power in Eurasia, and expected that the great power cooperation of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union could continue in the post-war period as it had during the war. The refusal of the Soviet Union to cooperate in the United Nations, in the joint administration of Germany, and in control of fissionable nuclear materials, as well as its aggressive political pressures on Iran, Turkey, and Greece, soon showed the impossibility of great power cooperation as a political policy for the post-war world.

THE TWO BLOC WORLD

The cold war that followed gave rise to new United States military postures. The containment policy of President Harry Truman's administration was followed by the Republican "new look" (an effort to reduce defense costs) and the resulting shift, during the administration of Dwight Eisenhower, to a policy of massive retaliation as enunciated by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

Dulles, who saw the world in black and white terms, refused to recognize the right of anyone to be neutral and tried to force all states to join the United States side in the cold war or be condemned to exterior darkness. In June, 1956, he publicly denounced

the principle of neutrality, which pretends that a nation can best gain safety for itself by being indifferent to the fate of others. This has increasingly become an obsolete conception, and, except under very exceptional circumstances, it is an immoral and short-sighted conception.

Having thus divided the world into two blocs, Dulles sought to set up between them a continuous circuit of paper barriers along all the land frontiers of the Soviet bloc from the Baltic Sea, across Europe and Asia, to the Far East. The chief portions in this barrier were the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(Nato) in Europe, the Central Treaty Organization in the Near and Middle East (Cento) and the South East Asia Treaty Organization (Seato) in the Far East. In theory, the paper barrier was made continuous by the presence of Turkey in both Nato and Cento and of Pakistan in both Cento and Seato.

Dulles cared little about the military strength, economic prosperity or political democracy of the states forming this paper ring around the Soviet bloc since their chief function was to form the paper barrier so that any movement outward by Russia or its satellites, by breaking the paper, would trigger the trip-wire circuit which would hurl United States nuclear retaliatory power on the Soviet homeland. In theory, this strategic policy meant that any outward movement by the Soviet Union or by one of its satellite states in some remote spot would lead to all-out nuclear war, initiated by the United States—a war that would totally destroy European civilization as we know it.

Strong feelings against Dulles were expressed by the uncommitted nations and by United States allies in Europe, especially France. Objections were based on three factors: (1) Dulles' insistence that the world was basically a two-power political balance in which neutrality could not be allowed, (2) the impression given by Dulles that the most backward rice paddy of southeast Asia was of strategic importance equal to the advanced countries of Europe, (3) Dulles' willingness to bring relations between the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of war over minor and remote areas with little or no consultation with the European allies who would be the first targets of Soviet retaliation if his decision led to war.

The danger that Dulles' policies might involve Europe in nuclear warfare without European consultation became evident during a number of crises in the Eisenhower period. In July, 1956, Dulles' sudden withdrawal of the United States offer to Egypt to help finance the construction of a high dam at Aswan began the long Suez crisis which culminated in the Suez War of October, 1956; the sudden landing of United States

marines in Lebanon in July, 1958, was regarded as an act of aggression by Moscow; and the possibility of atomic war in the Far East became acute later that same year when the United States mobilized a carrier task-force in the Formosa Straits which was prepared to make war on Communist China in defense of Nationalist China's possession of the Chinese territorial islands of Quemoy and Matsu.

To reduce the possibility of involvement in a nuclear war arising from decisions in which it had not shared, France, in September, 1958, suggested the creation of a tripartite commission of the United States, Britain and France to consider extra-European questions which might involve Nato in nuclear war. This request was rebuffed and, as a result, the alienation of France from the United States began. This process continues today.

Great Britain, although alienated from the United States by Dulles' attitudes and policies, was too deeply committed to the idea of an English-speaking Atlantic community to follow France toward neutralism. This drift was evident in the French refusal to allow its soil to be used as a base for nuclear-armed American planes; in the French withdrawal of the French Mediterranean fleet from co-operation with Nato; and in France's insistence on working towards atomic weapons of its own in spite of the United States refusal to provide technical guidance such as we had provided for the British nuclear bomb project.

To varying degrees the other European states, including members of Nato, neutrals such as Sweden and Austria, and the Soviet satellite states, objected to United States policies in Europe itself. The last group, especially Czechoslovakia and Poland, and several of the lesser Nato states, including Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, and Belgium, still had a great fear of Germany. Accordingly, the United States desire for a reunited and armed Germany was regarded as dangerous. So long as Germany was divided in two parts and disarmed, it was not itself a threat to the stability of Europe, but a re-united Germany with its own weapons, even neutralized, would be a force of instability;

there could be no guarantee that it would not, at some future moment, ally itself with either the West or the East against the other. Even if it remained neutral, under the umbrella of Soviet-United States nuclear stalemate, it could put pressure on its smaller neighbors such as Denmark or Netherlands.

Above all, the European powers, especially the Communist bloc, looked with horror on the idea of a Germany with nuclear weapons, a prospect which the United States might have accepted as a strengthening of Europe against Russia. Indeed, the United States arming of Nato with nuclear tactical weapons, such as nuclear cannon, short-range nuclear rockets (like Honest John and Davy Crockett), and its tactical bombing planes with nuclear arms, was regarded with uneasiness throughout Europe. Although the United States could justify this as the only way to overcome the Soviet numerical advantage in manpower (which arose, to some extent, from the reluctance of our European allies to maintain adequate infantry forces), everyone felt that a Soviet-Western ground clash in Europe could easily escalate through nuclear tactical weapons to large-scale nuclear destruction and radioactive pollution of European cities.

SOVIET STRATEGY TO 1960

Throughout this period (say to 1960), Soviet strategic and security concepts were influenced relatively little by the advent of nuclear weapons. Even earlier, during World War II, the Soviet military had little faith in strategic bombing and attributed little credit for the defeat of Germany to the Anglo-American strategic bombing of Europe. With this outlook there was little place for strategic air attack, nuclear surprise, or 24-hour war in Soviet policy. There was considerable discussion of these within the Soviet armed forces from 1945 on, but change toward the American view, especially in relation to the significance of surprise and strategic nuclear attack, did not take place in the U.S.S.R., to any important degree, until intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads became operational about 1960. Until that time, Soviet disarmament efforts aimed at

those armament restrictions which would allow the Soviet mass ground forces to dominate the great landmass of Eurasia.

Soviet suggestions about disarmament received rather ambiguous replies from the United States, which was more concerned with details of enforcement and inspection than it was with the substance of disarmament. There were two reasons for this. The greatest Soviet military assets were the Soviet ground forces, but these we could estimate and judge. On the other hand, we were much less clear on the degree of Soviet nuclear armaments and were, moreover, much more fearful of a surprise Soviet nuclear attack on us than they were of such an attack by us on them. As a result, nuclear inspection inside the Soviet Union was, for the United States, an essential feature of any nuclear armaments control agreement.

In general, from 1953 onward, any advances in weapon technology, even by the Soviet Union itself, tended to make the role of Russian infantry forces less decisive. Moreover, such advances were more of an economic burden on the Communist states because of their more limited and more backward technological base. They could not really compete with the United States in manufacturing modern weapons on a mass basis, although they could produce smaller amounts of top quality.

In a similar fashion the growth of neutrals, in Africa, the Near East, and Asia, weakened the Soviet position. The Russians could afford neither economic and technical assistance on a large scale nor could they accept pluralism of outlook and diversity of aims so easily as the Western bloc. For example, foreign aid made the United States more prosperous, because it reduced the threat of underemployment just as the armament industry did, whereas both foreign aid and armament production in the Soviet Union reduced its ability to raise the standard of living of its own people or to reequip its factories.

Moreover, from 1956 onward, the ability of the United States to strike at the Soviet homeland without using third countries as

bases steadily improved. From about that year, the intercontinental bomber, the B-52, replaced the allied-based B-47 as SAC's nuclear weapon vehicle. About the same time, nuclear-propelled submarines, each carrying 16 nuclear-armed Polaris missiles, began to prowl under the seas within range of the Soviet Union. And finally, by 1962, ICBM's in the United States (such as the Minutemen) began to replace the IRBM's, such as Jupiter and Thor, based on the territories of the United States' European allies (Turkey, Italy, Britain). The net result was that the direct destruction threat was intensified after 1960, and the need to involve the intervening powers, members of either Nato or the Communist Warsaw Pact, was reduced.

This last point must be made clear. Joseph Stalin feared an attack by ground forces across the Soviet frontiers; almost equally he feared that the Russian people should discover that economic prosperity and the development of backward areas could be successful under any system less tyrannical than his own. Under Khrushchev both these ideas are obsolete. The greatest military threat to the Soviet Union now comes neither from bordering states nor on the ground, but descends from the skies in the deep interior of the Soviet Union from launching sites thousands of miles away. And the existence of successful non-Stalinist, and even non-Communist, systems, in Yugoslavia, Italy, West Germany and elsewhere can no longer be concealed, even from the Russian people.

Accordingly, Stalin's insistence that the Soviet Union be surrounded by a buffer of completely subservient satellite states is no longer necessary. Combined with increasing Soviet ability (since 1960) to hit the United States directly by nuclear missiles rather than to strike at the United States indirectly by attacking its allies and bases around the borders of Russia, this change has tended to obviate the encircling wall of paper barriers.

NUCLEAR STALEMATE

From both sides, the movement toward long-range missile warfare and, finally, to nuclear stalemate has served to reduce the pres-

sures from the two superpowers on the states surrounding the Soviet Union and has led to increased independence and neutralism among them. The independence of France toward the United States by 1964 was matched by the independence of Poland and Rumania toward the Soviet Union. This neutralism and independence flourished under the umbrella of the so-called nuclear stalemate between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

The Cuban missile crisis clarified this stalemate and marked a turning point in Soviet-American relations, similar in some ways to the Fashoda Crisis of 1898 between France and England. It showed both sides that neither wanted war and that their interests were not always antithetical. Thus it signaled the easing of the cold war and of the insane armaments race between them. It showed that the United States had missile superiority sufficient to veto any major Soviet aggression, while the Soviet Union had sufficient missile power, in combination with the generally non-aggressive United States attitude, to discourage the United States from using its missile superiority against the Soviet Union.

This American-Soviet stalemate, by inhibiting the superpowers, permitted "third powers" to escape, to a considerable extent, from the need for power sufficient to back up their actions; thus third states have gained a freedom of action beyond their own intrinsic powers. This meant Panama could put pressure on the United States; Indonesia could act truculent in spite of its domestic semi-collapse; China could attack India without fear of interference; Pakistan, although allied to the United States, could be cozy with Red China; Cyprus could defy Turkey; Egypt could attack Yemen; France could ignore the United States; Rumania could flirt with Peking; and Britain or Spain could violate the American boycott on trade with Cuba. All of these things could be done, despite the superpowers, since their strength is largely cancelled on the world stage by their need to use power to neutralize one another.

One significant consequence of this situation is the almost total collapse of the system

of international law which was formulated in the seventeenth century by writers like Grotius. That system of international law regarded the state as the embodiment of sovereignty, an organization of political power on a territorial basis. The criteria for the existence of such a sovereign state was its ability to defend its boundaries against external aggression and to maintain law and order among its inhabitants within those boundaries.

By 1964, as a consequence of the power stalemate of the cold war, dozens of "states" (such as Congo), which could neither defend their frontiers nor maintain domestic order, were recognized as states by the superpowers and their allies, and achieved this recognition in international law by being admitted to the United Nations. This development climaxed more than 50 years of destruction of the old established distinctions of international law, such as the distinction between war and peace (destroyed by the "China Incident" of 1931-1941; by the Spanish confusions of 1936-1939; and by the cold war since 1947, which is neither war nor peace); the distinction between belligerents and neutrals (destroyed by the same events and by British economic warfare in both world wars); or the distinction between civilians and combatants (destroyed by submarine warfare and by bombing of cities). Nuclear stalemate in the cold war context made it possible for political organizations with almost none of the traditional characteristics of a state to be recognized as states and to act irresponsibly, often surviving on economic subsidies won from one bloc by threatening to join (or merely to accept subsidies from) the other bloc.

Now that the realities of international politics are beginning to find recognition, the future of disarmament has become more hopeful than it has been in decades, although the chance of reaching any disarmament *agreements* remains slight. Disarmament is more likely to appear in the form of mutual disengagement and the tacit adoption of parallel actions than in the form of explicit agreements or signed documents.

Part of this return to reality is embodied

in the growing recognition that there are more situations in which the United States and the Soviet Union have parallel interests than there are in which their interests are antithetical. Certainly they have a common interest in avoiding nuclear war; in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states; in avoiding the poisoning of the atmosphere with radioactive fallout from nuclear testing; in slowing up weapon development, technological rivalry, and the space race in order to divert more resources to domestic problems of poverty, social disorganization and educational needs; and in ceasing to outbid one another in grants of arms and aid to unreliable, ungrateful, unstable, inefficient, neutralist regimes.

The first clear evidence of recognition of this common interest was the peaceful settlement of the Cuban missile crisis. The first formal agreement based on it was the nuclear test ban treaty of 1963.

By 1964, considerable areas of common interests were apparent among the states of the world in all three groups: Nato, the Communist bloc and the neutrals. Moreover, technical advances such as U-2 or A-11 overflights, orbital satellite inspection and geophysical detection techniques have solved some of the problems of inspection and enforcement of disarmament agreements. As a consequence, the possibility of agreement is greater now than at any time since 1932.

THE UNDERDEVELOPED NEUTRALS

The problem for the neutrals is how four factors can be combined to provide the setting for other desires. The four are (1) independence from great power interference and conflicts; (2) economic and technical assistance from the great powers and other advanced countries; (3) the avoidance of neighborly squabbles in the absence of a great power; and (4) the direction of available wealth and resources to economic and social purposes rather than to armaments and controversy. The solution of the problem of how to combine these four would seem to rest in wider use of international agencies, both to control local controversies among neutrals and

to direct the foreign aid and resources of the neutral states constructively.

The role of neutrals in the world disarmament problem is simple enough. These states are eager to limit or prohibit all weapons which they cannot afford or cannot produce because of their technological backwardness. Thus they are against all nuclear weapons, nuclear testing, and nuclear wars. This opposition usually extends to other elaborate weapon systems such as ICBM's, Polaris nuclear submarines, and intercontinental bombers. Thus, neutrals provide a large mass support for arms control and disarmament on a global basis, but this support is relatively irresponsible and will not provide much real assistance in achieving workable disarmament agreements. Neutrals might, however, provide some support against borderline great powers (such as France, Red China, West Germany, or Japan) who might be unwilling to accept armament restrictions on which the superpowers had agreed.

THE GREAT POWER NEUTRALS

One of the chief consequences of the relaxation of the cold war has been the disintegration of the two super blocs. The most spectacular example of this process has been Red China's break with Soviet Russia over the latter's effort to combine domestic de-Stalinization with international coexistence. But other examples are frequent and increasingly obvious, such as the Albanian and, more recently, the Rumanian support for Red China against the Soviet Union, or, in our own bloc, increasing French and British independence toward Washington; more recently we have had the violent controversy within Nato between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus.

This process is bound to go much farther. In a certain sense, it means that countries that were previously members of the two superblocs are moving toward the neutralist position we have just described. But the fact that some of these countries, like France, are advanced industrial areas and themselves great powers, makes their position quite different. These great power neutrals will be in a position to support modern armaments, in-

cluding nuclear arms, and they will be able to do this simultaneously with extensive mobilization of economic resources for economic development without the need for capital or technical assistance from any other state.

The shift in the attitudes of these countries, especially in Western Europe, is understandable. For many years, they were dependent for protection on United States strength within the Nato alliance. But the revival of their own strength and prosperity, combined with a decreasing need for their territories as United States bases for intermediate-range nuclear weapons, and the dwindling threat of direct Soviet aggression across Europe, has made them more independent of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Now they feel free to pursue more independent policies. But Western Europe cannot be really independent unless it can assume the status of a third superpower. This is feasible, since a European Union with close to 300 million people, the most highly trained, technologically advanced, and most prosperous single group of that size in the world, would be a superpower comparable to the other two in that exclusive category. The chief obstacles to the achievement of such a European Union lie in Germany and France.

The great aim of German policy is the reunification of Germany. This the Soviet Union could never allow except on a Communist basis, which, in turn, the United States and the rest of Europe could not permit. In fact, only the Germans themselves want the reunification of this talented but dangerous people, even though the United States is officially committed to it. Moreover, the West German Republic has taken the position in the past that it could not approve any Soviet-United States disarmament agreement before the reunification of Germany.

Because of Germany's great potential power, none of the lesser states of Europe would enter a European Union which included a unified Germany, since that would give Germany the domination of Europe which the wars of 1914 and 1939 were fought to prevent. Moreover, the lesser states, like Denmark or

the Netherlands, are very reluctant to join a European Union which includes West Germany but does not include Britain as a counter-weight; they do not consider France, or a combination of France and Italy, strong enough to prevent West German domination of a European Union without Britain.

But de Gaulle's idea of reviving the glories of France as an independent nation state and his refusal to accept Britain as a fellow in a European Union as long as Britain retains its close relationship with the United States greatly dims the prospects for European political union in the near future. Without any obvious evidence of widespread support for his ideas among the French people, de Gaulle seems inclined to regard a revival of French influence as leader of the neutrals and the states of non-Europe as preferable to the submergence of France in a European Union, however powerful that Union might be.

The disintegration of the Western super bloc and of Nato within it has been paralleled by the process of disintegration within the Soviet bloc. In its earliest stages, with the rise of Titoism after 1947, dissident Communist states could find support against Moscow only in the Western bloc, but, since the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, such Communist dissidents, led by Albania, have found support in Red China.

There are, however, several great differences between the United States attitude toward dissidents in Nato and Moscow's attitude toward dissidents in the Communist bloc, especially the Warsaw Pact countries. In military matters, the United States regards

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BOOK REVIEWS

ARMS AND ARMS CONTROL

TOMORROW'S WEAPONS. By J. H. ROTHSCHILD. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. 181 pages, appendices, bibliography and index, \$6.95.)

Brigadier General Rothschild was formerly commanding general of the United States Army Chemical Corps Research and Development Command, and he writes with authority on what he terms "tomorrow's weapons." It may be difficult for the reader to accept his premise that chemical and biological weapons—toxics, as they are called—are "the most humane weapons of all." But this is the assumption that General Rothschild develops with considerable skill, comparing the potential of toxics with nuclear and conventional arms. It is perhaps only the reader's unfamiliarity with the use of these weapons that makes this study so distasteful.

At the same time, General Rothschild is concerned with ending the arms race, and he feels that biological weapons can be used by an international authority to help keep the peace. "The only assured method of preventing the unacceptable damage from a nuclear war is to see that such a war cannot occur," he writes. "This requires the acceptance of a comprehensive system, all parts of which must be adopted at one time. The establishment of a system of law, including a charter, legislature and courts, is futile without a way of enforcing the law." In the peaceful world that Rothschild envisages, a "world ruled by law," he believes that "the incapacitating toxic agents would be weapons of choice for the international peace force. They would permit enforcement of the peace with a minimum of suffering and of loss of life." Appendices tabulating the principal types of disease that might be useful in

biological warfare inform and chill the reader.

THINKING ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE. By HERMAN KAHN. (New York: Horizon Press, 1962. 254 pages, \$4.50.)

Herman Kahn's earlier book, *On Thermonuclear War*, has been regarded by some as a handy textbook on the military problems involved in national security, and by others as the work of an evil spirit. Defending his research as a military analyst, Kahn advances the premise "that even if one were to consider thermonuclear war unthinkable, that would not make it impossible." Further, and more important, he believes that "failure to think may even make it more probable that the lethal equipment which indubitably exists might be used, and, if used, be used more destructively than necessary." He pleads for the recognition that military issues need to be discussed on their merits, and maintains that "We cannot expect good discussion of security problems if we are going to label every attempt at detachment as callous, every attempt at objectivity as immoral." Having made these points "In Defense of Thinking," partly in his own defense, Kahn continues to discuss "possible sizes and shapes of thermonuclear war," civil defense, the strategic concepts of deterrence, war games, and alternative national policies ranging from unilateral disarmament to preventive war.

The book may leave the reader feeling very depressed, struggling with a curious medley of military and scientific jargon which is assumed by this author to be a mark of "systematic, hard-headed professional work." Kahn maintains that "we still need a program, a blueprint, and at least some glimmering of a theory of where

we are and where we want to be." But, even accepting his premise that we must think about the unthinkable, the reader may still want to look further for a constructive program.

THE ABOLITION OF WAR. By WALTER MILLIS AND JAMES REAL. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963. 217 pages, \$4.50.)

Walter Millis and James Real also demand that the reader begin to think; their challenge, however, is that he begin to consider the way in which the "great revolution in the international order, . . . the abolition of the organized war system," may be brought about.

The destructiveness of modern weapons, these authors argue, is almost unimaginable. Even "the fourth or fifth generations of scientists who have never worked on anything but weaponry and who view their careers as a lifelong dedication to the creation of a succession of exotic weapons systems stretching through foreseeable time" are not dedicated to war. After tracing the long history of warfare as a driving force in the lives of men and nations, the authors note that "The dethronement of military power in the world has begun." Although "For the first time in history, we do not know what military power really consists of," there are indications that the institution of warfare, like the institutions of feudalism and of slavery, is obsolete. Believing that "There is nothing in either capitalist, mixed or Communist economics to compel us to accept the ultimate suicide of our civilization," the authors ask for an end to the great war myths and an acceptance of the premise that a world without war is not only possible, it is a strong future probability.

Any solution to the arms dilemma that postulates the continuance of a war system is foredoomed, as they see it. Arms control may be a useful "stopgap," but "it offers no foundation on which to build a viable world order." Further, "a gradual disarmament program, which clings tenaciously to

all the supposed values of the war system as it proceeds, is most unlikely to proceed at all." The recognition that war and the arsenal of modern weapons are ineffective and anachronistic is the prerequisite to the abolition of war.

"The design of a demilitarized world is, it is believed, a good deal less difficult, and much less Utopian, than is usually assumed," they write. Mutual demilitarization is the key, according to this study, and a working model is available in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Students concerned with the techniques of weapons control should study this challenging book.

STUDIES OF WAR. By P. M. S. BLACKETT. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1962. 239 pages and index, \$3.95.)

Winner of the Nobel Prize in physics in 1948, Professor Blackett has written and talked a great deal about arms and arms control. His substantial articles and lectures on nuclear weapons are collected in Part I of this volume; a briefer Part II concerns the new field of Operational Research. Noting that in the United States, "the impediments to disarmament are becoming more and more seen as economic, political and emotional in origin, rather than as based on operational military considerations," Blackett calls for a major reduction in nuclear weapons and the methods of delivering them as the first step on what he terms "The Real Road to Disarmament." As he puts it, "The simplest big first step, and the one most consistent with realistic military considerations, is that the two giant powers should reduce their nuclear forces to a very low and purely retaliatory role—that is, that each should retain only sufficient invulnerable long-range vehicles to attack the other's cities if it is itself attacked." Further reduction of arms would be desirable, to "prevent nuclear weapons from being used by sane governments as weapons of aggression or blackmail."

Section I will prove of special interest

to the reader interested in arms and disarmament. Section II, an analysis of the science of operational research, consists of two notes written by Blackett during World War II. It is less general in interest, although it is possible, as Blackett suggests, that the same scientific methods may be applicable to research on peace in the post-war world.

CHANGE, HOPE AND THE BOMB. By DAVID E. LILIENTHAL. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. 168 pages, \$3.50.)

"A narrow preoccupation with the Bomb is myopic because it fails to see the potential heights of human achievement," writes David Lilienthal, first Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, who states his basic personal outlook on life in this slender and hopeful book. "Hopefulness and optimism are a part of my testament of faith," he writes, "because man must have hope if he is to be a man." Decrying the "mythology of disarmament," he calls for "the slow growth of community among man" which he terms "the true disarmament." The "Single Solution," he believes, is a myth, and "our preoccupation with Solutions . . . keeps us from wholeheartedly pursuing . . . the many roads and paths to a real disarmament." Not a world government, but a "world community" is suggested as the goal. In a world of vast change, Lilienthal restates his personal witness: "I believe in man. I believe he will not perish. . . . I do not believe that God created man and endowed him with the capacity to unlock the energy within the very heart of matter in order that he should use that knowledge to destroy this beautiful world, which is the handiwork not of man, but of God."

A WARLESS WORLD. EDITED BY ARTHUR LARSON. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1963. 174 pages and appendix, \$4.95.)

Here 12 well-known specialists in problems of arms control and disarmament out-

line the difficulties and advantages that man will encounter in a world without war. Problems of security, of peaceful evolution, of economics and population, and spiritual and psychological issues are explored. Among the distinguished contributors are Louis B. Sohn, Arnold Toynbee, Walter Millis, Kenneth Boulding and Arthur Larson. "Proposals for Study and Action," the final chapter, will offer suggestions for further discussion. The appendix, a reprint of Russian views of a warless world, is equally valuable.

PREVENTING WORLD WAR III. Some proposals. EDITED BY QUINCY WRIGHT, WILLIAM M. EVAN AND MORTON DEUTSCH. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962. 441 pages, notes and index, \$6.95.)

Dedicated to "the next generation" and to the premises that "nuclear war is not inevitable," and that "the belief that it is inevitable can help make it so," these useful essays range broadly over the field of stopping the arms race, reducing international tensions and building a world society. American, British, Russian, Norwegian and Yugoslav scholars are all represented.

POWER AT THE PENTAGON. By JACK RAYMOND. (New York: Harper and Row, 1964. 334 pages, notes and index, \$6.50.)

On the staff of *The New York Times* Washington Bureau, covering defense affairs, Jack Raymond is able to evaluate the "tremendous peacetime authority" now in the hands of our civilian and military employees. He believes that "the enormous range and complexity of our military effort represents a clear and present danger to our democracy," and repeats President Dwight Eisenhower's warning that the United States could become a "garrison state." As he concludes, "The margin of difference between a garrison state, even when created by civilian leaders purely out of a concern for security, and a militaristic state embellished with a panoply of military customs and castes, cannot be very great."

T.H.B.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

Khrushchev-Johnson Notes on the Use of Arms

On December 31, 1963, Nikita S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., sent a New Year's message from the Kremlin to heads-of-state throughout the world. On January 18, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson replied for the United States. On April 20, 1964, it was announced that the United States and the U.S.S.R. were limiting production of fissionable materials. The full texts of the New Year's letters follow. The April 20 announcements on nuclear materials will appear in Current History, July, 1964.

KHRUSHCHEV MESSAGE

I am sending you this message in order to draw your attention to one of the problems that, in our opinion, is of particularly great significance for strengthening peace—the question of territorial disputes between countries and the ways of settling them.

I should like to explain, first of all, the reason why the Soviet government is raising this question at this precise moment and why it is regarded as one of great urgency and significance.

I hope you agree that life itself now implacably places the problem of maintaining and strengthening peace in the center of all people's attention regardless of their nationality and race, of their political and religious convictions.

Through the combined efforts of many states, it has recently been possible to achieve certain successes in reducing international tension. It is the accepted opinion that the signing of the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, which has been warmly acclaimed by all peoples, is a major step forward towards a peaceful settlement of urgent international problems. The agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, secured by the unanimous resolution of the United Nations, to keep vehicles with nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction out of orbit, has also been positively acclaimed by all who want to strengthen

peace. These steps¹ have been a good beginning and now must be followed further.

In recent months, it will be recalled, opinions have been exchanged among governments of several states concerning the possibility of carrying out a number of additional measures toward relaxing international tension and strengthening peace. Agreement on such measures would naturally have a positive effect on the international situation. The Soviet government proceeds on the assumption that the search for agreement on ripe international questions will be continued.

Giving due appraisal to what it is customary to call the realities of the atomic age, one has to acknowledge that it is the common duty of statesmen, who bear great responsibility for the destiny of the world and the future of peoples, to agree to even more radical steps conducive to eliminating the danger of another war.

Seeking to contribute to the accomplishment of this great task, the Soviet government made a proposal for general and complete disarmament. It is generally recognized today that realization of this proposal would secure a genuinely stable and inviolable peace. The trouble, however, is that when the matter comes to specific negotiations on general and complete disarmament and on drafting an appropriate international treaty—and such talks have been going on for some years—it turns out that not all states, by any means, are ready to take practical steps in this direction.

They evidently have their own reasons for this, but it is not my intention to analyze them here or, even less, to start polemics on this question. All I want to do is to state the fact that talks on general and complete disarmament have yielded practically no tangible results so far.

¹ For the text of the nuclear test ban treaty, see *Current History*, October, 1963, pp. 235 ff. For the text of the "Hot Line" Agreement, see *Current History*, September, 1963, pp. 178 ff. For the text of the U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Outer Space, see p. 364 of this issue.

Struggle for the implementation of the idea of general and complete disarmament, which embodies the most cherished aspirations of the peoples, continues and will continue until agreement is reached, until it is implemented. As before, the Soviet Union, for its part, is doing, and will continue to do, everything necessary to promote its success. It will be recalled that new steps in this direction were undertaken by the Soviet government of the 18th Session of the United Nations General Assembly that recently ended its work.

Analyzing the present situation, the Soviet government came to the conclusion that it would be advisable, while tirelessly working to settle the problem of general and complete disarmament, to intensify its efforts to remove friction in the relations between states and the breeding grounds of tension.

I think that you will agree with me that if we try to pick out the questions that most often give rise to dangerous friction between states in different parts of the world, these undoubtedly will be territorial disputes, the problems of frontiers between states, mutual or one-sided claims of states to each other's territory. Here are the factors that lead to this problem. All this is taken from life and one cannot but ponder over this, I think.

The question of boundaries or, to be more specific, of territorial claims and disputes is not new, of course. It has existed over practically the entire history of humanity and, not infrequently, has caused sharp conflicts between states, mutual mistrust, and enmity among the peoples. The seizure of foreign territories was the invariable attendant of wars of conquest waged by many rulers in ancient times, in the Middle Ages and in the course of modern history. And the numerous colonial wars? Their main aim was also invariably to seize other peoples' territories, to enslave other peoples. No one can deny this now, no matter how the colonialists in their time covered up their sinister deeds by talk about a "civilizing mission."

In our century too, territorial claims of states have caused a number of armed conflicts. The desire to seize foreign territories played a great part in the two world wars that were engendered by imperialism. Tens of millions of lives were sacrificed to the Moloch of war. The aims of those who, in Kaiser Germany on the one hand, and in the entente countries on the other, hatched plans for recarving the map of Europe and other parts of the world in their favor, gave impetus to events that evolved into World War I. The claims of Hitler Germany and its allies in aggression to *lebensraum* at the expense of other nations paved the way for World War II.

But while it is true that territorial claims in many cases have led to wars and armed conflicts, it is also equally true that wars as the means of

settling territorial disputes have always been very costly to the people. No sooner had one state seized disputed territory from another state by armed force than the latter began to prepare a new war to regain the lost territory. After that the cycle repeated itself. Suffice it to recall, for instance, how Alsace and Lorraine changed hands, and how rivers of blood were shed at each change. After each war for territories, the territorial disputes between states proved to be even more acute, perhaps, than before the war.

Many of these territorial disputes were also inherited by our generation. Now the number of such disputes and reciprocal claims has increased even further. One of the reasons for this is that many young sovereign states that have recently won national independence have inherited a large number of artificially involved border problems from the colonial regimes. A glance at the political map of the world today will show scores, if not hundreds, of districts that are disputed by various states.

Of course, territorial claims and disputes between states are different in character. There are some that are associated with the completion of the liberation of this or that people from colonial oppression or foreign occupation. It is well known that not all young national states, by any means, managed to liberate from the power of the colonialists all the territories that are theirs by right immediately after they became independent.

Taiwan is a case in point. That island has, since time immemorial, been an integral part of the Chinese state. Taiwan's unlawful occupation by American troops should be terminated. The island is an inalienable part of the People's Republic of China and would have long since been reunited with it but for outside interference by another state.

If other examples are needed, they are there for all to see. Take, for instance, a recent case like West Irian's reunification with Indonesia. The demands of the liberated states for the return of territories that are still under the colonial yoke or under foreign occupation are unquestionably just.

All this, of course, also applies to the territories of peoples who have not yet achieved national independence and whose status is still colonial. One cannot recognize the casuistry of the colonialists who still hold colonies, contending that these colonial territories are component parts of the metropolis. There should be no ambiguity about that: the right of all colonial peoples to liberation, to freedom and independence, proclaimed in the United Nations Declaration to give independence to colonial countries and peoples, cannot be questioned by anyone.

I should like to say that the role of all who are sincerely interested in completing as soon as pos-

sible the liquidation of the disgraceful colonial system, whose remnants still poison the atmosphere of our planet, is to help these peoples to shake off colonial oppression most quickly. The more quickly and more completely it is done, the better for the cause of world peace. The peoples still under colonial domination are striving to achieve their freedom and independence by peaceful means. But these means are not always adequate, because those who are interested in preserving and perpetuating the remnants of the colonial system frequently reply by force of arms to the legitimate demands of these peoples for the abolition of colonial regimes. In this event the oppressed peoples have no other choice but to take up arms themselves. And this is their sacred right.

War bases, established on foreign territories and alienated from their own states, should likewise be liquidated. And no one should be misled by arguments that the land on which such bases are built and foreign troops stationed was leased under some treaty or agreement some time in the past. The way such agreements were concluded in the past is no secret to anyone: the stronger imposed his will on the weaker. At present the countries that at one time were compelled to lease their territory for the construction of foreign bases find it difficult to tolerate their presence and demand the dissolution of the treaties on war bases, restoration of their territory, dismantling of bases and withdrawal of foreign troops. These just demands should be satisfied.

There is one more problem, that of unification—of Germany, of Korea, of Vietnam—which is associated to a certain degree with the territorial question. In the postwar period each of these countries was divided into two states with different social systems. The desire of the peoples of these countries for unification should be treated, of course, with understanding and respect. It goes without saying, however, that the question of reunification should be settled by the peoples of these countries and their governments, without any interference or pressure from the outside and, certainly, without foreign military intervention—occupation—as is actually the case, for instance, in South Korea and South Vietnam.

No force should be used to settle this question, and the peoples of those countries should be given an opportunity to solve the problems of unification by peaceful means. All other states should contribute to this.

But this is not the question we are examining here. The question before us is how to deal with territorial disputes and claims that arise over the presently existing, well-established frontiers of states. Let us have a look, first of all, into the nature of these disputes and claims.

The demands of the revenge-seeking circles of certain states that were the aggressors in World

War II are made by a special group among such claimants. Circles craving revenge for the lost war are harboring plans for revising the just post-war territorial settlement. First they want those territories that went to other states to compensate for the aggression and to provide guarantees of security for the future. Such territorial "claims" must be resolutely rejected as incompatible with the interests of peace, because nothing but a new world may grow out of these claims.

There are, however, other territorial claims and border disputes and they, perhaps, are the most numerous. Those disputes have nothing to do with the postwar settlement. To justify their claims, the disputants advance arguments and considerations relating to history, ethnography, blood affinity, religion, and so forth.

Often, one state justifies its territorial claim to another state by such arguments, and the latter, in turn, finds other arguments of the same kind, but of absolutely opposite nature, and itself advances a territorial counterclaim. The result is the kindling of passions and deepening of mutual strife.

How can one tell which side is right, whose position is just and whose unjust? In some cases this is very difficult because the existing borders came into being as a result of the influence of many factors.

In many cases, references to history are of no help. Who can affirm that, say, a reference to the 17th Century, which one state puts forward in substantiation of its territorial claim, is more valid than, for instance, the reference to the 18th or 19th Century by which the other state tries to bolster its counterclaim? And if one were to take as the basis for solving a border dispute the entire history, spread over several millenia, all would agree, one would think, that in many cases no true solution could be found. Nor can we forget that references to history are frequently made to provide a cover for overt aggression, as was the case, for instance, with Mussolini's references to the borders of the Roman Empire to substantiate his territorial grabs in the Mediterranean, which the Italian fascists even christened "*mare nostrum*," i.e., "our sea," in an effort to present themselves as the heirs of the ancient Romans.

Occasionally it is difficult to get one's bearings amid numerous "arguments" based on national ethnographic or blood affinity grounds. The development of mankind was such that some peoples are now living on the territories of several states. On the other hand there exist multinational states inhabited sometimes by tens of peoples, some even belonging to different races.

Unfortunately, disputes about borders take place not only between historians and ethnographers but also between states, each of which possesses armed forces—sometimes quite big. Life shows

that the majority of territorial disputes are fraught with the danger of complicating relations between parties—with the possibility of a serious armed conflict—and, consequently, constitute a potential threat to universal peace. This means that understanding of boundaries, as they formed in the course of history, must be duly displayed.

Perhaps, there may be some naïve people who would say that since the majority of territorial disputes concern relations between small states, which do not possess nuclear weapons, nothing terrible can happen: so a couple of small countries do have a quarrel, or fight it out between themselves if worse comes to worst. What of it? It will not have any terrible consequences for mankind.

But such views are wrong and harmful. Can one remain indifferent if people's blood is shed over border disputes? Moreover, one should be a realist about this. Today, when the development of international relationships has resulted in the close intermingling of states—economic, political, strategic, and other; when complex systems of alliances are in existence; a clash that occurs in one place, and would seem to be purely local in nature, might quickly escalate to involve many other states.

This would involve commitments of allies and the fears, real or imaginary, of other states, both adjoining the area of the conflict and those thousands of kilometers away from it concerning their security. And, we say it outright, it would involve certain states that simply want to take advantage of a local conflict to achieve their special predatory aims. At the same time one cannot fail to reckon with the fact that wars that begin by using conventional weapons, may develop, today, into a world war using thermonuclear weapons.

I believe you will agree with me that especially dangerous to all humanity would be an armed conflict over borders in that area of the world where both world wars started in the past and where, at the present time, great numbers of troops and armaments of states belonging to the two principal antagonistic military groupings are concentrated. Europe is such an area—this is undeniable.

Without doubt, if a world thermonuclear war breaks out as a result of a local clash of states striving to settle their territorial disputes by armed force, it will spare no one. No one would be able to avoid it. No one, except madmen or political figures blinded by hatred, can be resigned to such a prospect.

I should like to say quite definitely and firmly that in the Soviet Union there are no such political figures and, had they appeared, they would certainly have been committed to a madhouse. The main line of the policy of the socialist states, aimed

at strengthening peace and preventing war, is exactly the earnest of the fact that on our side armed force will not and cannot be used to settle any territorial dispute in our favor. One would like to think that the statesmen of other countries, including the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance and other military blocks created by the Western powers, realize the formidable dangers now involved in any attempts to use force to settle territorial issues.

It is our deep conviction that the use of force to settle territorial disputes is not in the genuine interests of any people, of any country.

It is not in the interests of the European peoples, who inhabit countries where almost every inch of soil has been drenched with blood shed in past wars. These peoples, by their labor, did not create their economy, build factories and mills and plough land, in order to plunge headlong into fateful military adventures for the sake of seizing a strip of land from their neighbors.

And is it not dangerous for the peoples of Asia to use force to revise state borders existing in their part of the world? Of course, they don't need that. Is it not a fact that the border conflicts between some states of Asia have a most adverse effect on their life even now? The peoples of the Asian continent face great tasks. It is exceedingly important for them to build up their national economy, to lay the groundwork for modern industry, to bring about a turning point in the efficiency of their agriculture so as to deliver the population of their countries from age-old poverty and want. This calls for great efforts and, above all, for peace and tranquility on the borders. Now that border conflicts not only exist but also are sometimes even aggravated between Asian states, they are compelled to maintain and even increase their armed forces and expend their resources unproductively. Who profits by this? Certainly not the peoples of the countries that have liberated themselves from colonial oppression.

The question of frontiers between African states is a very complicated and knotty question inherited from colonialism. But despite the complexity of territorial problems, the summit conference of African states, in its Charter of the Organization of African Unity, adopted in May 1963, unanimously stressed the impermissibility of settling territorial differences and disputes between African states by force and the necessity of resolving such questions exclusively by peaceful means.

Africa is throwing off the last colonial fetters. The young African states have much to do to liquidate the dire effects of colonialism and to stand firmly on their own feet. The implementation of this task requires the unceasing efforts of all forces and means.

The recent events in North Africa leave no doubt

that the cause of strengthening and developing the independent African states is substantially harmed when one of them embarks upon the road of using armed forces against another in the attempt to satisfy its territorial claims. One should not forget, also, that conflicts between African states over territorial questions may prove to be a bonus for stronger states that have not yet abandoned hope of getting back in this, or another, way some of what they have lost.

And what about Latin America? To this day some of the Latin American countries are unable to recover from the effects of military clashes caused by territorial disputes that occurred in the past. It suffices to recall the war between Paraguay and its neighbors at the end of the 19th Century, during which so much blood was spilt that the population of Paraguay is still less than before that war. Is it worthwhile for Latin American countries to sharpen knives against each other, in these days, when there is so much they yet have to do?

I do not know what words to choose, but it is my desire to express with utmost clarity the thought that there are not, nor can there be, any territorial disputes today between existing states, any unresolved frontier questions, for whose solution it is permissible to use armed force. No, this cannot be allowed to happen, and we must do the utmost to rule out the possibility of such an event developing.

One may ask—and I reckon this question has already come to your mind—does the Soviet Union propose to cross out with one stroke all territorial issues between states, to abandon all attempts to settle them, as if these issues did not exist at all? No, that is not the point.

We realize that some countries have weighty reasons for their claims. In all current frontier disputes between states, the sides must, of course, study the matter thoroughly in order to settle these issues. We are wholly in favor of this. The only thing we oppose is military methods of solving territorial disputes. That is what we should agree upon: precisely upon that.

As for peaceful means of settling territorial disputes, experience proves them to be feasible.

Even the existence of different social systems and forms of state power in the modern world need not be an obstacle to the peaceful solution of territorial problems, provided, of course, it is sincerely desired by both sides. Life shows that whenever states firmly abide by the principles of peaceful coexistence and display good will, restraint and due regard for each other's interests, they are quite capable of extricating themselves from the maze of historical, national, geographical and other factors and finding a satisfactory solution.

It is also important to stress that while the mili-

tary road—that is, the use of force—does not lead to ending territorial conflicts, but rather deepens and aggravates them, the peaceful road, on the contrary, disposes of such conflicts and eliminates the very source of the dispute to a considerable extent. More opportunities for solution are offered by level-headed consideration of issues than by the disputing sides being ready to start a shooting war against each other.

Everything, including the tremendous changes that have occurred lately in the world and that throw a new light on many international questions, the territorial problem among others, shows that *at present we have a situation in which it is possible to set and solve in a practical way the task of ruling out from international life the use of force in territorial disputes between states.*

The possibility of achieving a radical change in solving these questions by peaceful means is also facilitated by the increasing recognition of the idea of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. The idea of peaceful coexistence, which lies at the root of our Leninist foreign policy, found expression in the decisions of the historic Bandung Conference, in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, and, in many other international documents. More and more governments in the world are coming firmly to the conclusion that in the nuclear age war can no longer be a means of settling international disputes, and that peaceful coexistence is the only foundation on which relations between states can and should be built.

Neither can one fail to see that the present progress of science and technology, which opens enormous prospects for increasing industrial and agricultural production in all territories, exposes still further the falsity of the arguments of those who are wont to refer to overpopulation or inadequate economic efficiency of their own country to justify their territorial claims.

A peaceful settlement of territorial disputes is also aided by the fact that in the practice of international relations there already exist many improved methods for peaceful settlement of outstanding issues: direct negotiations between the states concerned, use of good offices, request for assistance from international organizations, etc. Although, in my opinion, the United Nations in its present form is far from being an ideal instrument of peaceful cooperation of states, even this organization, granted an impartial approach, can make a positive contribution to the cause of peaceful settlement of territorial and border issues.

Considering all this, the Soviet government, guided by the interests of strengthening peace and preventing war, is submitting the following proposal for the consideration of the governments of all states: *to conclude an international agreement*

(or treaty) on the renunciation by states of the use of force for the solution of territorial disputes or questions of frontiers. In our opinion, such an agreement should include the following principal propositions:

first, a solemn undertaking by the states, parties to the agreement, not to resort to force to alter existing state frontiers;

second, recognition that the territory of states should not, even temporarily, be the object of any invasion, attack, military occupation or any other forcible measures directly or indirectly undertaken by other states for whatever political, economic, strategic, frontier, or any other considerations;

third, a firm declaration that neither differences in social or state systems, nor denial of recognition or the absence of diplomatic relations, nor any other pretexts can serve as a justification for the violation by one state of the territorial integrity of another;

fourth, an undertaking to settle all territorial disputes exclusively by peaceful means, such as negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and also other peaceful means selected by the parties concerned in accordance with the charter of the United Nations Organization.

Needless to say, such an international agreement should cover all territorial disputes concerning existing borders between states.

The proposed agreement would be a confirmation, specification and development of the principles of the United Nations Charter concerning relations between states on territorial matters, an expression of good will and determination of states to abide firmly by these principles.

The Soviet government is deeply convinced that the assumption of a commitment by states to solve territorial disputes by peaceful means exclusively will introduce more order into international affairs. The conclusion of an international agreement by states to renounce the use of force for the solution of territorial disputes would dispel, like a fresh wind, many international problems that are artificially exaggerated and that create obstacles to the relaxation of tension and to the consolidation of peace in the world. It would bring about a new and considerable improvement in the international climate and would create a good basis for greater confidence among states.

One can say with confidence that in the new situation, which would be created by the conclusion of an agreement by states on denouncing the use of force for solving territorial disputes, it would be much easier to find a solution to other basic international problems as well. This refers primarily and mostly to the problem of disarmament.

Indeed, the desire of some states to resort to force against other states to settle border disputes in their favor has always been and remains one of

the main factors stimulating the arms race. Territorial disputes between states are a nutrient medium for militarism as well as for inflaming passions, which are so willingly exploited by those who regard an unbridled arms race as a source of their profits. In a situation in which states have no worry about their frontiers and in which any plans for changing these frontiers by force are banned by a universal international law, many of the motives leading states to increase their armed forces must disappear.

This will expose still more the bankruptcy of those who either hesitate to agree to disarmament or, trying to conceal their willingness to reach agreement on this question, refer to difficulties arising from the present situation in view of the unsettled territorial disputes. The great powers must set an example in disarmament.

It is also clear that opportunities for large-scale international peaceful cooperation will immeasurably increase under conditions in which states have no ground for mutual suspicions concerning frontiers. A powerful impetus will be given to the development of trade and transport communications, cultural exchanges and scientific contacts for the good of the peoples. Every state, every people, and the world as a whole, will stand to gain from this.

As to the form of a future international agreement on the renunciation by states of the use of force for the solution of territorial disputes, and also the method of conducting talks on the conclusion of this agreement, it seems to me that it would not be very difficult to reach agreement, if, of course, the sides concerned show interest in this. The Soviet government, for its part, is ready to do its utmost to facilitate the solution of these questions.

In conclusion I would like to express the hope that you will study attentively the considerations of the Soviet government, set forth in the present message, and that they will meet your favorable response. These considerations are dictated by the interests of peace, by a desire to contribute to the prevention of war.

Sincerely,

N. KHRUSHCHEV
Chairman of the U.S.S.R.
Council of Ministers

Moscow, the Kremlin, December 31, 1963.

All Soviet papers, January 4, 1964

JOHNSON REPLY

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I welcome the stated objective of your December 31 letter and agree with much of its contents. It is my hope that we can

build on these areas of agreement instead of merely emphasizing our well-known disagreements. This Nation is committed to the peaceful unification of Germany in accordance with the will of the people. This Nation, which has fundamental commitments to the Republic of China, has for many years sought the renunciation of force in the Taiwan Strait. This Nation's forces and bases abroad are for collective defense, and in accordance with treaties and agreements with the countries concerned.

Let us emphasize, instead, our agreement on the importance your letter places on preserving and strengthening peace—and on the need to accompany efforts for disarmament with new efforts to remove the causes of friction and to improve the world's machinery for peacefully settling disputes. In this spirit, let us both present new proposals to the Geneva Disarmament Conference—in pursuit of the objectives we have previously identified:

- to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons;
- to end the production of fissionable material for weapons;
- to transfer large amounts of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes;
- to ban all nuclear weapons tests;
- to place limitations on nuclear weapons systems;
- to reduce the risk of war by accident or design;
- to move toward general disarmament.

I am sure you will agree that our task is to work hard and persistently on these and other specific problems and proposals—as you and President Kennedy did on the Test Ban Treaty—instead of confining ourselves to vague declarations of principle that oppose some wars but not all.

Your letter singles out the problem of territorial disputes and concludes that "the use of force for the solution of territorial disputes is not in the interest of any people or any country." I agree; moreover, the United States proposes guidelines to implement this principle which are even broader and stronger than your own.

First, all governments or regimes shall abstain from the direct or indirect threat or use of force to change

- international boundaries;
- other territorial or administrative demarcation or dividing lines established or confirmed by international agreement or practice;
- the dispositions of truce or military armistice agreements; or
- arrangements or procedures concerning access to, passage across or the administration of those areas where international agreement or practice has established or confirmed such arrangements or procedures.

Nor shall any government or regime use or threaten force to enlarge the territory under its control or administration by overthrowing or displacing established authorities.

Second, these limitations shall apply regardless of the direct or indirect form which such threat or use of force might take, whether in the form of aggression, subversion, or clandestine supply of arms; regardless of what justification or purpose is advanced; and regardless of any question of recognition, diplomatic relations, or differences of political systems.

Third, the parties to any serious dispute, in adhering to these principles, shall seek a solution by peaceful means—resorting to negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, action by a regional or appropriate United Nations agency or other peaceful means of their own choice.

Fourth, these obligations, if they are to continue, would have to be quite generally observed. Any departure would require reappraisal; and the inherent right of self-defense which is recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter would, in any event, remain fully operative.

You will note the basic similarities in our position. Agreement should not be impossible on this or other propositions—and I share your hope that such agreement will stimulate disarmament and peaceful relations.

The prevention of wars over territorial and other disputes requires not only general principles but also the "growth and improvement" to which you refer regarding the machinery and methods for peaceful settlement. The United States believes that the peace-keeping processes of the United Nations—and specifically its Security Council—should be more fully used and strengthened and that the special responsibilities and contributions of the larger countries—particularly the permanent members of the Security Council—deserve greater attention in solving its financial problems.

In consultation with our allies, we shall offer specific proposals along these lines in the weeks ahead. Both the Geneva Disarmament Conference and the United Nations are appropriate places for such discussions.

Mr. Chairman, let me assure you that practical progress toward peace is my most fervent desire. This requires not only agreements in principle but also concrete actions in accord with those principles. I believe this exchange of letters offers real hope for that kind of progress—and that hope is shared by all peace-loving men in every land.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON
January 18, 1964

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

On October 17, 1963, the U.N. General Assembly called on all nations to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space, following a United States-Soviet expression of intention to refrain from stationing weapons of mass destruction in outer space. On December 24, 1963, the General Assembly adopted a resolution dealing with international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. The complete text of the October 17 resolution and excerpts of the December 24 resolution follow:

OCTOBER 17 RESOLUTION

The General Assembly

Recalling General Assembly resolution 1721 (XVI) which expressed the belief that the exploration and use of outer space should be only for the betterment of mankind,

Determined to take steps to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space,

1. Welcomes the expressions by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of their intention not to station any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction in outer space;

2. Solemnly calls upon all States:

(A) To refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner;

(B) To refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the conduct of the foregoing activities.

DECEMBER 24 RESOLUTION

The General Assembly

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I

1. Recommends that consideration should be given to incorporating in international agreement form, in the future as appropriate, legal principles governing the activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space;

2. Requests the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to continue to study and report on legal problems which may arise in the exploration and use of outer space, and in particular to arrange for the prompt preparation of draft international agreements on liability for damage caused by objects launched into outer space and on assis-

tance to and return of astronauts and space vehicles;

3. Further requests the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session on the results achieved in preparing these two agreements;

II

1. Endorses the recommendations contained in the report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space concerning exchange of information, encouragement of international programmes, international sounding rocket facilities, education and training and potentially harmful effects of space experiments;

2. Welcomes the decision of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to undertake, in co-operation with the Secretary-General and making full use of the functions and resources of the Secretariat:

(a) The preparation of a working paper on the activities and resources of the United Nations, the specialized agencies and other competent international bodies relating to the peaceful uses of outer space;

• • •

(e) The establishment, at the request of the Government of India, of a group of six scientists to visit the sounding rocket launching facility at Thumba and to advise the Committee on its eligibility for United Nations sponsorship in accordance with the basic principles endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 1802 (XVII);

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III

1. Notes with appreciation:

(a) The second report of the World Meteorological Organization on the advancement of atmos-

(Continued on page 366)

PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

(Continued from page 325)

will be in sight. Disarmament is not so much a technological as a psychological problem: the readiness of men for it. The premise for it—the deadly destructiveness of total weapons and the neighborly interdependence of all peoples—has come into existence for the first time in the post-World War II world.

POSTWAR DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

(Continued from page 340)

thus indicated a growing consensus on some of the basic issues of disarmament. When one compares the level of agreement at the present time with that of the Stalin era, there is some basis for optimism. But consensus on principle is not enough. The details of the disarmament system must be worked out, yet the negotiations have seldom advanced that far.

NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

(Continued from page 345)

fied that they run little risk by foregoing additional atmospheric tests.²

There were also important political incentives for both sides to agree to a treaty at that time. The Cuban missile crisis had brought home to everyone the urgency of reducing the threat of nuclear war. The Soviet Union needed a détente with the West so that it could devote more attention to internal difficulties and to the growing split with the Chinese Communists.

Although a limited test ban is to be preferred to none at all, and better late than never, the present agreement is less effective

in several respects than was envisioned in 1958 when the negotiations began:

1) The test ban came too late to put a limit on the ultimate destructive capability of nuclear weapons. Both sides can already build bombs larger than they could really use.

2) The ban is not universally accepted. A great many nations have joined in, but the two most likely contenders for admission to the nuclear club, France and China, refuse to accede to the treaty. Thus the spread of nuclear weapons has not been completely halted.

3) The ban is incomplete. Continued underground testing by some parties could so arouse the fears of others as to provoke them to a withdrawal from the treaty, which is easy under the terms of the treaty itself.

4) Every trace of international monitoring, inspection and control has been discarded. This was the price that had to be paid to get any treaty at all. But if procedures for monitoring and inspection could not be agreed upon for this relatively simple situation, the outlook is poor for early agreement on arms restrictions that would require more comprehensive procedures.

The limited test ban does have some valuable consequences. The major sources of fallout have been temporarily eliminated. Also, relations between the U.S.S.R. and the West have continued to improve since the signing of the treaty, which justifies the predictions that a test ban would help reduce international tensions.

The test ban is still unfinished business. The present limited treaty is an important advance, but its ultimate value will have to be judged more by developments that may stem from it than by what it has accomplished so far.

WEAPONS CONTROL ABROAD

(Continued from page 353)

Nato as a recipient of American military support for the protection of Western Europe rather than primarily as a contributor to the defense of North America. The Soviet Union regards the Communist European satellites

² An exposition of the Kennedy Administration's view of this may be found in the testimony of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, August 13, 1963. For excerpts see *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. XIX, No. 8 (October, 1963), pp. 42-43.

primarily as contributors to the security of the Soviet Union itself. Politically, the United States encourages the unification of Western Europe and would accept the right of such a Union to be independent of the United States, while the Soviet Union could not accept any Eastern European union, even an economic one, which was independent of Moscow. Finally, the United States has no great need for the economic resources of Western Europe for its own economic goals, and might well find Europe's prosperity and industrial efficiency a detriment to its own prosperity, while the Kremlin finds the resources of Eastern Europe almost essential to its economic aims and continues to regard that area as an economic colony.

The growing complexity and diversity of the world, as indicated by the rise of neutralism, the congregation of these neutrals in diverse blocs, and the weakening or even the disruption of the two super blocs makes the chance of achieving any widespread and specific disarmament agreements unlikely. But the same developments make the chances of achieving tacit arms reduction through parallel actions and specific agreements on narrow topics or areas more likely. The reason for this apparent paradox is that the growing diversity and independence of states are a consequence of their growing feelings of security and their reduced fears of being exposed to aggression or nuclear war. This decrease in fear and rise in security is the necessary preliminary of any arms control, and decreasing tension is likely to continue even if the accompanying diversity of outlooks makes wide or explicit agreements less easy to achieve.

The obstacles to arms control agreement will lie not only in conflicts between the two superpowers but also in the growing influence and diversity of the neutrals and the increasing disintegration of both superpower blocs. The whole process will reflect an almost total disappearance of the world as envisaged by John Foster Dulles a decade ago and the appearance of a world much closer to the present reality and to the interests and hopes of the American people, and to those of the world as well.

PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE (Continued from page 364)

pheric sciences and their application in the light of developments in outer space;

(b) The organizational and financial steps taken by the Fourth Congress of the World Meteorological Organization in response to resolutions 1721 C (XVI) and 1802 (XVII), section III;

2. *Endorses* efforts towards the establishment of a World Weather Watch under the auspices of the World Meteorological Organization to include the use of satellite as well as conventional data, with data centres to facilitate the effectiveness of the system;

3. *Urges* Member States:

(a) To extend their national and regional meteorological efforts to implement the expanded programme of the World Meteorological Organization;

(b) To co-operate in the establishment of the World Weather Watch;

(c) To increase research and training in the atmospheric sciences;

4. *Invites* the World Meteorological Organization to make a progress report to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in 1964 relating to its activities in this field;

IV

1. *Notes with appreciation* the second report of the International Telecommunication Union on telecommunication and the peaceful uses of outer space;

2. *Welcomes* the decisions of the Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference, held in October and November 1963 under the auspices of the International Telecommunication Union, on the allocation of frequency bands for space communication and procedures for their use as a step in the development of space radio communications;

3. *Invites* the International Telecommunication Union to make a progress report to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in 1964 relating to its activities in this field;

4. *Recognizes* the potential contribution of communications satellites in the expansion of global telecommunications facilities and the possibilities this offers for increasing the flow of information and for furthering the objectives of the United Nations and its agencies;

V

Requests the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to continue its work as set forth in General Assembly resolutions 1472 (XIV), 1721 (XVI) and 1802 (XVII), as well as in the present resolution, and to report to the Assembly at its nineteenth session on the activities of the Committee.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of April, 1964, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Central Treaty Organization (Cento)

April 28—In Washington, a meeting of the Cento Ministerial Council opens.
April 29—Cento ministers issue a communiqué at the end of their annual 2-day meeting urging that peace be restored to Cyprus.

Disarmament

April 20—In simultaneous statements by U.S. President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, it is announced that they have agreed to reduce production of materials used in nuclear weapons. Johnson declares that the U.S. will reduce by 15 per cent its production of enriched uranium, over a four-year period, in addition to the 25 per cent cut announced in January. Khrushchev announces that the Soviet Union will halt construction of 2 reactors for producing plutonium; reduce "substantially" the production of uranium-235 over the next several years; and put more fissionable materials to peaceful uses.
April 21—British Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home tells Commons that Britain took part in the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on nuclear materials reduction; Britain will gradually stop producing military plutonium.
April 23—The 17-nation Geneva disarmament conference agrees to a 6-week recess.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

April 13—The Council of Ministers agrees in principle to subscribe to an anti-inflation program under which the 6 Common Market nations will work together to stabilize prices and production costs.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato)

April 3—Nato Secretary General Dirk U. Stikker announces that he will retire during the summer for reasons of health.
April 4—The Nato alliance celebrates its fifteenth anniversary.
April 28—The French government issues a communiqué ordering the removal of French naval staff officers from Nato commands in the Mediterranean and the English Channel.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.)

April 28—Japan becomes the twenty-first member of the O.E.C.D.

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (Seato)

April 12—Prior to the opening tomorrow of the Ministerial Council of Seato, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville confer in Manila.

April 13—at the opening of the Ministerial Council meeting, Couve de Murville rejects the U.S. contention that South Vietnam is capable of defeating the Vietcong rebels.

April 15—Seato members issue a communiqué at the close of the 3-day meeting voicing support for the South Vietnamese war against the Vietcong offensive. Couve de Murville withdraws support from that part of the communiqué dealing specifically with South Vietnam.

United Nations

April 2—in the United Nations Security Council, the Soviet delegation urges that

British aggression against Yemen be condemned. Last week Britain attacked a Yemeni fort in retaliation for a Yemeni attack against the Federation of South Arabia.

April 9—The Security Council approves a resolution condemning a British bombing of a Yemeni fort last month.

April 24—In a 19-page note to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant, the Cuban government condemns U.S. reconnaissance missions over Cuba.

ALGERIA

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

April 16—President Ahmed Ben Bella welcomes nearly 2,000 delegates to the first congress of the National Liberation Front (the only legal party in Algeria).

April 21—The Congress elects Ben Bella Secretary-General of the F.L.N. A Central Committee composed of 103 persons is also approved. The Congress closes.

April 23—It is announced that a new 17-member Political Bureau has been approved by the Central Committee of the F.L.N.

AUSTRIA

April 2—A member of the Conservative People's Party, Josef Klaus, is sworn in as Austrian chancellor. He succeeds Alfons Gorbach. Klaus heads a coalition Socialist-People's party cabinet.

BELGIUM

April 1—Over 10,000 Belgian physicians strike to protest a new national health insurance law establishing a fixed low fee schedule. Doctors close their offices and leave hospitals unattended.

April 12—Following a deadlock in negotiations, the government orders the mobilization of physicians.

April 13—The striking doctors cancel the emergency treatment being provided at hospitals.

April 18—It is announced that Belgian doctors have agreed to return to their jobs while government and medical leaders negotiate a settlement.

April 21—Premier Théo Lefèvre tells parliament that the fee schedule for physicians under the new health insurance plan will be revised upward.

BHUTAN

April 6—It is announced that Premier Jigme P. Dorji has been assassinated by an unidentified person.

BRAZIL

April 1—The War Ministry announces that President João Goulart has resigned, following the success of yesterday's rebellion. The revolution was supported by military leaders and 10 state governments. The rebels oppose Goulart's leftist leanings. Goulart flees to Brasilia from Rio where he pledges to continue the fight against the rebels. The rebels declare that the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Ranieri Mazzilli, has assumed the presidency, as next in line.

April 2—It is reported that Goulart has fled into exile. Mazzilli is sworn into office as Acting President. Congress is required to name a new president within 30 days. U.S. President Johnson sends "warmest good wishes on your installation as President . . ."

April 3—U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk voices approval of the new regime in Brazil.

April 4—Brazil's military leaders ask Congress to elect a military leader to serve out the remainder of Goulart's term, which expires on January 31, 1966. The military leaders also urge that the government be purged of pro-Communists.

President Mazzilli announces his new Cabinet.

Goulart arrives in Uruguay to seek political asylum.

April 5—It is reported that an anti-Communist campaign has resulted in the arrests of several thousand persons.

April 9—The army, navy and air force commanders proclaim a decree empowering them to carry out an anti-Communist program; the new decree, called the Institutional Act, permits the 3 commanders-in-

chief to remove congressmen, and members of the state legislatures or municipal councils.

April 10—The revolutionary Government ousts 40 congressmen in a Communist purge. The political rights of the 40 congressmen plus those of 60 other leading Brazilians are suspended for 10 years.

April 11—Congress elects Army Chief of Staff General Humberto Castelo Branco President to serve the remainder of Goulart's term.

April 15—Castelo Branco is inaugurated as President. He announces his cabinet.

April 30—The Congress approves a 100 per cent average salary increase for members of the armed forces.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS, THE

Cyprus

April 4—Cypriote President Makarios, in a note to Turkey, declares that he is terminating the common defense treaty subscribed to by Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.

April 5—Turkish Premier Ismet Inonu rejects Makarios' attempt to terminate unilaterally the Treaty of Alliance. The treaty permits Greece and Turkey to station troops in Cyprus.

April 6—A cease-fire agreement to end Greek-Turkish Cypriote fighting in western Cyprus is arranged by U.N. officers.

April 9—United Nations Under Secretary for Political Affairs Ralph J. Bunche meets with Archbishop Makarios and Vice-President Fazil Kutchuk (leader of the Turkish Cypriotes.)

April 11—President Makarios, leader of the Greek Cypriotes, in Athens for talks with Greek Premier George Papandreou, announces agreement on self-determination for Cyprus.

April 13—Papandreou outlines a 10-point policy on Cyprus in which "full and unrestricted independence" for Cyprus, following Cypriote self-determination, is urged. Makarios declares he supports Papandreou in full.

April 22—Makarios announces that the

Cyprus government is willing to offer a general amnesty to Turkish Cypriotes; Turkish Cypriote refugees returning home will be offered "every protection." Makarios also agrees to remove all Greek Cypriote fortifications on Cyprus under U.N. supervision if the Turkish Cypriotes will follow suit.

April 25—Greek Cypriote troops take control of a strategic point near the Kyrenia Pass and the Nicosia-Kyrenia Road, held by Turkish Cypriotes. A U.N. spokesman declares that 6 Turkish Cypriotes and 1 Greek Cypriote have been killed.

April 27—It is reported that Greek Cypriote security forces are advancing on Turkish Cypriote positions in the Kyrenia Pass.

April 29—U.N. Secretary-General U Thant presents a new peace plan to the U.N. Security Council; he proposes that a "top-level political officer" should be empowered to negotiate a Cyprus settlement.

The Cyprus government announces that troops in the Kyrenia Pass have been ordered to cease firing.

April 30—in a town on the southwest coast, a U.N. patrol disarms Greek Cypriote forces. In the St. Hilarion-Kyrenia Pass area, U.N. forces establish 12 posts.

Great Britain

April 9—Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home announces that he will not call a general election "before the autumn."

April 14—Chancellor of the Exchequer Reginald Maudling presents his 1964 budget to the House of Commons; a 10 per cent increase on taxes on alcoholic beverages is provided. Tax revenues will increase by £103 million (\$288 million).

April 22—The Soviet Union and Britain exchange imprisoned spies. Greville M. Wynne, serving an 8-year sentence since May, 1963, is returned to British authorities in exchange for Soviet spy Gordon Arnold Lonsdale, serving a 25-year sentence in Britain.

India

April 8—Sheik Mohammed Abdullah, the

"Lion of Kashmir," a political leader in Kashmir, is released from prison after serving over 10 years.

April 11—At the end of a 5-day meeting, the Indian and Pakistani Home Ministers issue a joint communiqué on minority problems. They have discussed the problem of internal religious minorities (the Hindus in Pakistan and the Muslims in India).

April 17—Speaking in Kashmir, Sheik Mohammed Abdullah denounces India for using slogans claiming that "Kashmir is an undetachable part of India."

April 29—Sheik Mohammed Abdullah arrives in New Delhi for talks with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on the future of Kashmir.

Malaysia, Federation of

April 8—It is reported over the Malaysian government television station that Prince Abdul Rahman, the prime minister, has declared that the cease-fire in Borneo is no longer "in operation" and that Malaysian and British troops will follow Indonesian guerrillas attacking Malaysian border points.

Pakistan

(See *British Commonwealth, India*)

Sierra Leone

April 30—Some 35 members of parliament withdraw their objections to the appointment of Finance Minister Albert Margai as the new prime minister. The Prime Minister, Sir Milton Margai, died earlier this week.

Tanganyika

April 23—It is officially announced that Tanganyikan President Julius K. Nyerere and Zanzibar's President Abeid Amani Karume have signed articles of union merging their countries.

April 25—Meeting in an emergency session the Tanganyikan parliament approves union with Zanzibar. The Zanzibar Revolutionary Council also approves union. The union will be known as the United Re-

public of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.

April 26—The union of Zanzibar and Tanganyika becomes official. Tanganyikan President Nyerere becomes President of the new republic. Zanzibar's President Karume becomes First Vice-President.

April 27—A new Cabinet is announced, composed of leaders from Tanganyika and Zanzibar.

Zanzibar

(See *British Commonwealth, Tanganyika*)

BRITISH DEPENDENCIES

Maldivian Islands

April 6—It is reported that an anti-British riot has erupted and that demonstrators have put out of operation a British airstrip at Hulule.

Southern Rhodesia

April 13—Following the resignation of Prime Minister Winston J. Field, Minister of Finance Ian D. Smith is named prime minister; it is reported that Smith represents the more militant, rightist branch of the ruling Rhodesian Front party.

April 16—The President of the People's Care-taker Council (1 of the 2 major African nationalist movements in Southern Rhodesia), Joshua Nkomo, and 3 other Africans are banished without a trial to a distant part of the country by order of the new government. In Salisbury and nearby townships, Africans demonstrate against this banishment and battle with police.

April 17—Some 200 African women protesting the detention of Joshua Nkomo are dispersed by police and dogs; 120 women are arrested. In an African township near Salisbury, some 7,500 children are absent from school in protest.

April 18—in Bulawayo, police fire on African demonstrators.

BULGARIA

April 21—Radio Sofia announces that the Bulgarian titular head-of-state, Dimiter Ganev, died yesterday. He was Chairman of the Presidium of the National Assembly.

April 23—The National Assembly elects Georgi Traikov Chairman of the Presidium of the National Assembly.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

April 19—It is reported in Peking that China and Japan have agreed to exchange foreign correspondents and to establish unofficial trade relations offices in one another's countries.

April 27—Following the agreement to establish diplomatic relations in January, 1964, it is announced in Peking that Huang Chen, a Chinese Communist Vice Foreign Minister, has been appointed Ambassador to France. (See also *France*.)

COLOMBIA

April 16—U.S. President Johnson announces that Colombia and the U.S. have agreed to undertake a study on the practicality of a sea-level canal running through Colombia to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

April 24—The Minister of Finance, Emmanuel Bamba, at a news conference, declares that the 1964 budget will be balanced.

CUBA

(See also *Intl., United Nations*)

April 24—The Cuban government purchases 10,000 tons of refined sugar in London and 10,000 tons of raw sugar in Paris.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

April 9—It is disclosed that Ramon Tapia Espinal has resigned from the civilian 3-man ruling junta. He is replaced by Ramon Caceres Troncoso.

April 19—Caceres Troncoso is sworn in. A Cabinet revision is announced.

ETHIOPIA

April 1—It is reported that fighting along the Somali-Ethiopian frontier has stopped. A cease-fire order becomes effective today in accord with the truce agreement reached several days ago.

FRANCE

April 9—The French Foreign Ministry announces an agreement with Portugal whereby France will be allowed to construct a missile tracking base on one of the Azore Islands.

April 10—France and Algeria sign a protocol to limit the number of Algerians emigrating to France.

April 13—Premier Georges Pompidou returns from a visit to Japan, where he met with Japanese leaders.

April 16—In a radio and television address, President Charles de Gaulle declares that France must build its own nuclear striking force unless it wishes to depend on "uncertain" protection by the U.S. He declares that French economic aid to the poorer nations must continue because it offers Africa, Asia and Latin America an alternative to U.S. and Soviet aid.

President de Gaulle undergoes a prostate gland operation. His condition is reported as very satisfactory.

April 27—It is announced that Lucien Paye has been appointed Ambassador to Communist China. He is a former minister of education. (See also *China*.)

GABON

April 12—Elections for the National Assembly are held.

April 13—It is reported that supporters of President Léon Mba won 27 of the 47 seats in the Assembly.

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

April 24—It is reported that East Germany has issued a decree increasing to 500 yards the "protective strip" along East Germany's borders with West Berlin and West Germany. Restrictions to keep unauthorized persons out of the border areas are tightened.

GUINEA

April 2—Guinean President Sékou Touré leaves for home after a visit with Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba. It is reported

that technical and cultural cooperation agreements were signed yesterday.

HAITI

April 1—President François Duvalier ("Papa Doc") is installed as president for life.

HUNGARY

April 4—Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and Hungarian leaders attend a celebration in Budapest marking the nineteenth anniversary of the defeat of Nazi soldiers by the Soviet army.

April 10—Khrushchev departs after a 10-day visit.

INDONESIA

April 1—Foreign Minister Subandrio arrives in the Netherlands for talks with Dutch leaders.

April 3—A technical cooperation agreement is signed by Subandrio and Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph M. A. H. Luns.

April 4—in Paris, Subandrio meets with French President de Gaulle to discuss the situation in Southeast Asia.

JORDAN

April 13—Jordan's King Hussein arrives in the U.S. for a state visit at President Johnson's invitation.

April 15—King Hussein and President Johnson end 2 days of private talks. (See also *U. S. Foreign Policy*.)

April 17—at the U.N., Hussein meets with U.N. Secretary-General U Thant.

KOREA, SOUTH

April 20—Student demonstrations against the Government continue; some 57 students are arrested.

LAOS

April 4—Neutralist Premier Souvanna Phouma, in Peking, appeals for Chinese assistance in restoring neutrality and peace to Laos.

April 11—Premier Phouma returns to Laos.

April 17—Phouma meets with rightist leader General Phoumi Nosavan and Prince Sou-

phanouvong, head of the Pathet Lao (pro-Communist) party.

April 18—Following a meeting with right-wing and left-wing leaders, Premier Phouma announces that he will present his resignation to King Savang Vatthana, because of "the impossibility of resolving the Laotian problem."

April 19—A group of right-wing army officers, led by General Kouprasith Abhay, seize control of the government. Kouprasith Abhay is supported by General Siho Lamphoukakoul, military police head. Premier Phouma's coalition government of neutralists, rightists and leftists is ousted. General Abhay establishes a 15-man executive committee to rule the country.

The U.S. State Department issues a statement protesting the coup and voicing support for the "royal Government of National Union."

April 22—A member of the military junta declares that Premier Phouma has been asked to form a new government if he will resign first as premier. The junta spokesman, it is reported, voices his concern over a threat that the U.S. will cancel its aid unless Phouma is returned to office.

April 23—A communiqué is issued by the military junta announcing that Premier Phouma has been asked to remain in office as leader of the Government of National Union "in consideration of external policy." It is reported that major foreign governments, including the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., have urged that the ousted coalition government be restored.

April 24—Phouma agrees to meet the military junta's conditions for setting up a new cabinet.

April 25—The Revolutionary Committee, in a communiqué broadcast by the Vientiane radio, declares that it will not yield control of Vientiane until Phouma's new cabinet has been formed.

April 28—Military sources report that Pathet Lao forces attacked right-wing troops at Phou San, a ridge northeast of the Plaine des Jarres.

April 29—Soviet and British diplomatic offi-

cials in Laos leave for Pathet Lao headquarters at Khang Khay with a message from Premier Phouma for Prince Souphanouvong; Phouma asks that all fighting be halted and that he and Souphanouvong confer on the April 19 coup.

LEBANON

April 5—Elections for Parliament begin the first round. The election will be spaced out in 3 more stages during the month. Some 99 seats in the Chamber of Deputies are at stake.

NETHERLANDS, THE

April 29—Princess Irene of the Netherlands weds Prince Carlos Hugo of Bourbon-Parma in the Basilica of St. Mary Major in Rome.

PANAMA

April 3—The U.S. and Panama sign a joint declaration that "the causes of conflict" between them be settled quickly. It is agreed to resume diplomatic relations. U.S. President Johnson announces that Robert B. Anderson, a former Secretary of the Treasury, will be special ambassador for the U.S. in negotiations with Panama.

April 17—The newly appointed U. S. Ambassador Jack Hood Vaughn arrives in Panama to begin his duties.

RUMANIA

April 26—The Rumanian news agency Agerpress issues a statement that also appears in a major Rumanian newspaper. The statement urges the Soviet Union and Communist China to settle their differences; Rumania offers to act as mediator.

SAUDI ARABIA

April 1—Crown Prince Faisal, who seized the powers of the Saudi monarchy last month, pardons the 7 sons of deposed King Saud. Faisal cancels his order for their expulsion from the country.

SOMALI

April 3—It is reported that in Somaliland's first

national election, held late last month, the Somali Youth League party won 69 of the 123 seats in the National Assembly. Some 11 other parties capture the remainder.

SOUTH AFRICA, REPUBLIC OF

April 20—A panel of experts, established by U.N. Security Council resolution, issues a report on the racial situation in South Africa. The report urges that a national convention of South Africa's racial groups be called in the first step toward "nonracial" democracy.

April 29—In a white paper disclosed today in Capetown, it is revealed that the South African government has abandoned plans to impose apartheid in the South-West Africa trust territory.

SYRIA

April 15—The Government declares that a revolt in the city of Hama has been quelled.

April 17—The Damascus radio broadcasts 2 decrees issued by the chairman of the Revolutionary Council, Major General Amin el-Hafez. The decrees order that 3 textile factories be nationalized and that workers in "nationalized and state-run economic establishments" manage the companies themselves.

April 19—In Damascus shopkeepers strike to protest socialism in Syria; they also support the uprising in Hama, which government troops are still resisting. It is reported that the Hama revolt is being staged by "reactionaries and feudalists" who oppose the Baathist government's land reform program and socialist policies.

April 25—President Hafez announces that under a new constitution, the Revolutionary Council will be enlarged to include groups of "workers, farmers, lawyers, merchants, and 'unionists' [presumably those who favor union with the U.A.R.]."

April 28—The Revolutionary Council terminates its military treaty with Iraq.

In Damascus, Hama and Homs, merchants continue to strike by keeping their stores shut.

April 30—Following a government threat to

confiscate closed-shops, Syrian shopkeepers reopen their doors.

TURKEY

(See *British Commonwealth, Cyprus*)

U.S.S.R., THE

(See also *Intl., Disarmament*)

April 3—*Pravda* (news organ of the Soviet Communist party) publishes an editorial condemning Chinese Communist ideology and politics. A speech by Mikhail A. Suslov (the C.P.S.U.'s leading ideologist), made at a Central Committee meeting on February 14, 1964, is also published. Suslov's speech condemns Communist China for trying to split the unity of the Communist bloc.

In Hungary, Premier Nikita Khrushchev delivers a speech criticizing Communist China's "disruptive tactics," and urging greater Communist unity. (See also *Hungary*.)

April 11—Khrushchev returns to Moscow. A Hungarian-Soviet joint statement is published in which Hungary supports the Soviet Union in her ideological conflict with China.

April 13—Criticizing Peking, Khrushchev speaks at a dinner in honor of a Polish delegation, which arrived in the Soviet Union earlier today. Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz and Polish Communist (Workers) Party Secretary Wladyslaw Gomulka head the delegation.

April 15—At a Kremlin rally, Premier Khrushchev denounces Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party Mao Tse-tung. Gomulka also speaks critically of the Chinese Communists. Later, Khrushchev and Gomulka join Czech President Antonin Novotny and Mongolia's Premier Yumzhagiin Tsedenbal at a reception.

Bulgarian Premier Todor Zhivkov and Hungarian Premier Janos Kadar arrive in Moscow.

April 16—Chinese Communist top-ranking leaders send a birthday message to Khrushchev wishing him "good health and long

life"; they declare that Sino-Soviet differences are only "temporary."

April 17—Tass (official Soviet press agency) reports that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet has awarded Khrushchev the title of a Hero of the Soviet Union (the highest Soviet award) upon his seventieth birthday.

High ranking leaders from East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania call on Khrushchev.

April 25—Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella arrives in the Soviet Union; he is welcomed by Premier Khrushchev.

April 28—*Pravda* (Soviet Communist party newspaper) carries an editorial charging that the Chinese Communist party's leadership under Mao Tse-tung is not legal and that Mao's refusal to call a party congress since 1956 is a violation of party laws.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

April 23—U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser leaves for a 6-day visit to Yemen.

April 24—in Yemen, Nasser denounces "British colonialism" in Aden and other British protectorates in the Arab world.

UNITED STATES, THE

Civil Rights

(See *Segregation and Civil Rights*)

Economy

April 16—at a news conference, President Lyndon Johnson announces that the gross national product (total national output of goods and services) reached a record \$608.5 billion for the first 3 months of 1964. He declares that "higher price levels" are not necessary to maintain profits.

April 28—at a dinner for prominent U.S. businessmen, President Johnson declares that it may be possible to reduce taxes further in a few years' time.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Brazil, Jordan, Vietnam*)

April 5—at the opening of a University of North Carolina symposium, Arkansas Senator J. W. Fulbright charges that the cold war has created an excessive concern for

national security on the part of Americans. He urges that some of the energy directed toward the cold war be diverted and turned "back in on America itself."

April 9—U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk announces that he will visit South Vietnam during his trip to the Philippines (for a ministerial meeting of Seato) and to Nationalist China.

April 14—King Hussein of Jordan confers with President Johnson. Speaking for the Arab world, Hussein declares that there can be no compromise on Arab plans to dam 2 tributaries of the Jordan River; the plans are designed to block Israeli diversion of the waters of the Jordan River to irrigate the Negev desert.

April 16—U.S. Secretary of State Rusk confers in Taiwan with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

April 20—The U.S. State Department declares that aerial reconnaissance over Cuba will continue and warns against any attempts to interfere with reconnaissance planes.

April 21—Addressing editors and broadcasters at a State Department briefing on foreign affairs, Johnson declares that the U.S. war against poverty must be waged overseas as well as at home.

April 27—Rusk confers in Washington with British Foreign Secretary R. A. Butler, who is in the U.S. for a Cento meeting. (See also *Intl., Cento.*)

Government

April 4—The White House announces that President Johnson has allocated \$5 million in federal emergency disaster funds to Alaska as a first step in the earthquake recovery program.

President Johnson announces the appointment of Myer Feldman as his special counsel, replacing Theodore C. Sorenson. He names Lee White and Hobart Taylor Jr. as associate special counsels.

April 6—Both the Senate and the House approve a bill allotting \$50 million to rebuild

public facilities destroyed by the Alaska earthquake.

April 7—W. Averell Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, is appointed President Johnson's chief adviser on African Affairs.

A federal grand jury returns an anti-trust indictment against 8 major steel companies and 2 steel company leaders; the indictment accuses the steel companies of conspiring to fix prices on carbon sheet steel.

April 8—The Securities Exchange Commission announces a change in the rules on the New York Stock Exchange to regulate floor trading; the new rules, accepted by the New York Stock Exchange, go into effect in 30 days. The new rules are designed to eliminate conflicts of interest by a member handling public orders while buying and selling for his own investment.

April 11—President Johnson signs a cotton-wheat subsidy bill.

April 14—It is reported that the Budget Bureau, acting on orders from President Johnson, has notified federal agencies of its concern over the "almost continuous rise" in the average grade level of federal employees, with accompanying salary increases. The Budget Bureau urges federal agencies to slow promotions.

Federal Judge Archie O. Dawson dismisses the conspiracy charge against Roy M. Cohn (formerly counsel to the late Senator Joseph McCarthy) and his co-defendant Murray E. Gottesman. Nine other counts charging the two with perjury and obstruction of justice remain.

April 16—President Johnson announces a program to give recognition to outstanding public and private high school seniors, who will be designated "Presidential scholars." Johnson also states that he has appointed the New York theatrical producer, Roger L. Stevens, to head his administration's cultural program.

April 18—at a news conference, Johnson announces the appointment of Harold J. Russell (handless war veteran) to serve as

chairman of the President's Commission on the Employment of the Handicapped.

Johnson also announces that plans to review the military conscription law have been "drafted and approved."

The President announces that he has named Eugene G. Patterson to the Federal Civil Rights Commission; Patterson is editor of *The Atlanta Constitution*.

April 19—After a juror's father dies, a mistrial is declared in the case against Roy M. Cohn and Murray Gottesman.

April 21—Eight leading steel companies enter pleas of not guilty to a federal government antitrust indictment.

April 22—President Johnson speaks at the opening of the New York World's Fair. Civil rights demonstrators interrupt his remarks. (See also *Segregation and Civil Rights*.)

April 23—The Connecticut General Assembly in a special session approves a bill reapportioning Connecticut into 6 congressional districts equally divided on the basis of population. Governor John Dempsey signs the bill.

April 24—President Johnson tours 5 states for a personal look at poverty-stricken areas; he pledges the elimination of poverty in the U.S.

April 28—President Johnson sends Congress a \$228 million program to wipe out poverty in the 10 Appalachian states. The \$228 million covers costs for fiscal year 1965 only.

Labor

April 8—Four of the 5 operating railroad unions stage a surprise strike against the Illinois Central Railroad at 4:30 a.m. At mid-morning, railroad leaders announce that at 12:01 a.m. on April 10 they will institute new work rules designed to eliminate featherbedding. In an attempt to avert a nationwide railroad strike, Labor Secretary W. Willard Wirtz calls a meeting of union and management railroad officials.

April 9—President Johnson announces that union and management have agreed to a 15-day postponement so that government

mediators can try to negotiate a settlement in the 5-year dispute over work rules. The postponement came after a 4-hour meeting with the President.

April 22—President Johnson announces that agreement has been reached in settling the dispute between the operating unions and the nation's railroads. The agreement provides for wage increases for about 100,000 union workers. The railroads will be permitted to eliminate unnecessary jobs.

April 23—It is reported that President Johnson told the nation's railroads that the Administration is willing to review their claim that they be allowed to depreciate investments in tunnels and grading for tax purposes. Johnson has offered to arrange a meeting with representatives of the railroads and Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon.

Military

April 5—General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, 84, dies.

April 8—The White House announces that General Curtis E. LeMay, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, will continue to serve until February 1, 1965; he was expected to retire in June.

April 10—The Defense Department announces the withdrawal of some 7,500 U.S. troops from West Germany beginning in May.

April 14—The Defense Department publishes data comparing Soviet and U.S. military strength. The data reveal that the U.S. has more long-range bombers, more operational ICBM's, and more nuclear submarines.

Senior American officials in South Vietnam report that the U.S. Military Advisory Group will be merged with the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam to streamline U.S. operations.

April 23—It is announced that Major General Richard G. Stilwell will be the next Chief of Staff of the U.S. Military Assistance Command in South Vietnam; Stilwell replaces Major General Richard G. Weede,

who will take over in May as Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans at Marine Corps headquarters in Washington.

April 24—Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara announces that 63 military installations and administrative offices will be closed, consolidated or reduced; the U.S. will save some \$68 million annually.

April 25—U.S. President Johnson announces that the head of the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam, General Paul D. Harkins, will be replaced by Lieutenant General William C. Westmoreland.

Politics

April 1—On a visit to South Vietnam, former Vice-President Richard M. Nixon confers with U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge.

April 4—Winthrop Rockefeller announces that he is a candidate for the Republican gubernatorial nomination in Arkansas.

April 8—Returns from the April 7 Wisconsin Republican and Democratic presidential primary are reported: Democratic Governor John W. Reynolds received over 511,000 votes; Republican Representative John W. Byrnes received over 300,000 votes; and Alabama's Governor George Wallace, over 264,000 votes, or some 34 per cent of the total Democratic votes.

April 9—at a news conference, Pennsylvania Governor William W. Scranton says that he is not a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination; he would accept a draft because he believes that "no American has the right" to refuse.

April 15—Returns from the April 14 Illinois presidential primary are reported. In the Republican primary, Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater received 500,000 votes; Maine Senator Margaret Chase Smith received over 197,000 votes; Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge received some 52,000 write-in votes; former Vice-President Richard Nixon received 24,800 write-in votes. The Democratic primary did not list presidential candidates; there was a write-in vote for President Johnson and Attorney Gen-

eral Robert Kennedy, as well as for Governor Wallace.

Nixon returns from a 24-day tour of Asia.

April 20—President Johnson declares that all major candidates will be briefed on foreign policy and defense by the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency.

April 22—Arkansas Governor Orval E. Faubus announces that he will run for his sixth term against Winthrop Rockefeller.

April 28—Senator Clair Engle, Democrat from California, decides not to run for re-election. Senator Engle recently underwent a second brain operation.

The Massachusetts presidential primary is held. Henry Cabot Lodge is running first as the Republican presidential nominee. President Johnson receives strong Democratic support.

April 29—With more returns still to be counted it is reported that Lodge won 80 per cent of the votes in the Massachusetts primary.

Segregation and Civil Rights

April 6—Byron De La Beckwith's second trial opens. He is charged with the murder of Medgar W. Evers, Mississippi field secretary for the N.A.A.C.P.

Superintendent of New York City schools Calvin E. Gross confers with some 20 civil rights leaders on integrating New York schools and on quality education. The meeting, called without the knowledge of the New York City Board of Education, is attended by the Rev. Dr. Milton Galamison, Roy Wilkins, executive secretary of the N.A.A.C.P. and James Farmer, national director of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE).

April 7—at a school construction site in Cleveland, Ohio, where civil rights demonstrators are protesting segregated education, a Presbyterian minister is killed accidentally when he lies down behind a bulldozer. Rioting follows.

April 9—The Brooklyn, New York, chapter of CORE announces plans to instigate a traffic jam on the major roads leading to the New York World's Fair on opening day (April 22). The "stall-in" plan calls for hundreds of cars to run out of gas on roads to the Fair.

April 10—National Director of CORE James Farmer declares that the Brooklyn chapter is suspended because it will not give up plans for a "stall-in."

In Cleveland, attempts to solve the school integration conflict fail. Common Pleas Judge John V. Corrigan grants an injunction to prevent interference at school construction sites.

April 15—Senators Hubert H. Humphrey (Democrat of Minnesota) and Thomas H. Kuchel (Republican of California), in charge of the civil rights bill in the Senate, express their concern over the effect of "unruly demonstrations" on passage of the civil rights bill.

April 16—New York City Mayor Robert Wagner denounces plans for a "stall-in." President Johnson, at a news conference, declares that "violence and threats to safety" will not further the civil rights cause.

April 17—A mistrial is declared for the second time in the Byron De La Beckwith case after the jury reports that it was not able to reach a verdict.

April 20—A court order barring the World's Fair "stall-in" is obtained; New York civil rights leaders, at a meeting called by Queens District Attorney Frank O'Connor, reject an appeal to call off the "stall-in."

April 22—Militant civil rights leaders' plans fail for a "stall-in" of some 2,000 cars at the opening day at the World's Fair. Traffic is reported to be "less than normal." Some 294 demonstrators are taken into custody.

April 26—Archbishop Thomas J. Toolen issues an order that every Roman Catholic school in Alabama and northwest Florida desegregate.

April 28—The Inter-Religious Convocation

on Civil Rights, meeting in Washington, urges the passage of the civil rights bill in the Senate. The meeting, a "Witness to Racial Justice," is sponsored by the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the National Council of Churches and the Synagogue Council of America. Over 6,000 Catholic, Jewish and Protestant delegates are in attendance.

A 3-judge federal court in Alabama orders the Macon County school board to resume classes at Notasulga for 6 Negroes; the Notasulga high school, ordered to desegregate, burned 10 days ago.

Racial demonstrations continue for the second day in Nashville, Tennessee, where police, using billy clubs, break up protests by Negro students.

April 30—Six Negro students resume classes in the Notasulga High School auditorium.

Supreme Court

April 6—The Supreme Court decides that the merger of 2 banks in Lexington, Kentucky, violates Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, because such a merger presents a combination in restraint of trade. The Supreme Court holds that the El Paso Natural Gas Company must divest itself of the Pacific Northwest Pipeline Company because such a merger would tend to inhibit competition substantially, in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.

The Supreme Court decides that ex-Governor Ross Barnett of Mississippi and Governor (then Lieutenant Governor) Paul B. Johnson, Jr., can be tried for criminal contempt without a jury. The case arose from Barnett's and Johnson's attempts to prevent desegregation at the University of Mississippi in September, 1963, despite court orders to the contrary. A footnote to the majority opinion declares that if such cases are tried without a jury, the penalty is limited to that for a "petty offense."

April 27—The Supreme Court refuses to review a Court of Appeals decision upholding

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an arbitration award to allow the railroads to eliminate many jobs.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

April 9—Some 300 Vietcong (Communist) rebels attack South Vietnamese troops in Kien Hoa province.

April 15—Fighting between Vietcong guerrillas and government troops in the Mekong Delta area continues for the fourth day.

April 16—New Zealand's Prime Minister Keith J. Holyoake and British Minister without Portfolio Lord Carrington arrive in Saigon. They separately confer with Premier Nguyen Khanh and give him messages of support from their governments.

April 17—U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk arrives in South Vietnam for a 3-day visit. On his arrival, Rusk asserts that the U.S. will help South Vietnam to resist Communist aggression.

April 18—On a tour of Vietnamese villages, Rusk is accompanied by Premier Khanh and the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge.

April 20—in the U.S., Rusk reports to President Johnson.

April 27—It is disclosed that a Chinese priest, Father Hoa, who led a force of anti-Communist irregular soldiers in the Camau Peninsula, has been replaced by Major Chuong Chinh Quay.

April 28—Vietnamese military officials report that over 5,000 government soldiers are fighting the Vietcong rebels in 2 guerrilla strongholds in the central highlands.

YEMEN

April 28—A Sana radio broadcast announces that a new constitution has been adopted.

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